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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
“Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing wonder and awe - the starry
heavens above me and the moral law within me.”     - Immanuel Kant
Karol nervously glanced up and down the short aisle of candy bars, chewing gum,
and assortment of other convenience items.  He then fixated, chin down, on the bottom
shelf  where some 5 cent baseball cards were and remained completely stoic.  His hands
were dug deep in the hot pockets of his coat, sweating profusely.  The sound of his heart
pounding was the only thing audible to him.  Karol felt a heavy spotlight pressing down
upon him, revealing his fraudulent intentions to the world.  He could barely breathe.  The
cashier in the convenience store paid him no mind and continued to chat with the man
from pump 4.  Only seconds passed but it felt like an eternity to Karol.  His thoughts were
circular and panicky.  Just do it!  Just do it!  Just do it!  Finally, Karol could stand it no
longer and acted on the compulsion to stop his torment.  He quickly lunged forward
toward the bottom shelf, snatching a package of 5 cent baseball cards like a snake striking
its prey.  Putting the baseball cards in his pocket, Karol mechanically exited the store
without making eye contact with anyone.  Once outside the store, Karol leaped on his
bike and made the get-a-away of the century.  Several blocks away from the convenience
store, Karol began to slow down.  Looking back, he saw no one was following him.  The
heist was a success.  He quickly surveyed his environment, searching for a nice spot to
examine the loot.  A small, vacant loading dock next to a close-by building seemed to be
2the perfect place.  As soon as he got there, he tossed his bike on the grass and went over
to sit on the concrete.  He joyfully unwrapped the package and examined the cards
carefully.  Two out of the three cards were new!  Karol considered himself very lucky. 
As a child on Christmas morning with that special toy, Karol carefully examined each
card, reading every fact and statistic numerous times.  He even did this with the third card
that he already owned.  When he had finally satiated himself, he wrapped up the cards,
placed them in his pocket and laid back on the warm concrete, closing his eyes.    
 Not too long after this did Karol begin to get an unsettling feeling.  A rush of
panic and fear began to press down upon him, not unlike what he felt right before he had
stolen the baseball cards.  Karol knew what he had done was not right.  He just knew God
wouldn’t approve.  Karol looked around to see if someone from the convenience store
had discovered him.  There was still no one in sight.  Karol felt an overwhelming sense of
guilt and shame.  He felt tortured and tormented.  Karol finally reasoned that the only way
to make amends would be to return the baseball cards to the store and apologize.  With
heart hung low, Karol pedaled his way back to the convenience store to return the stolen
item.  
Karol entered the convenience store and walked directly to the cashier.  He
reached into his pocket for the baseball cards and laid the torn, open package on the
counter.  The cashier stared at him blankly.  Karol tried to explain but before the words
could reach his mouth the emotions reached his eyes and he burst out crying.  The
shocked cashier stood looking very confused at this young child having a melt-down in
the 7-11.  Between gasps of air, Karol tried to explain how he had stolen the cards and
how sorry he was.  The cashier, realizing the lack of severity of the situation and looking
3very uncomfortable, wanted to calm the child and end the melt-down as soon as possible. 
The cashier quickly doled out forgiveness, which Karol accepted and left the store.  
What caused Karol to realize that he had done something wrong? Did his family
show him that stealing was wrong?  Was he influenced by Sunday school?  How were the
emotions of shame and guilt associated with morality?  These are just a few of the
questions that prompted the current study of moral development.  It was hypothesized that
the foundation or building blocks of moral development such as one’s family interactions,
spiritual life, and ascription to different sources of moral authority (e.g., teachers and
peers, religious institutions, and one’s concern for society’s welfare and human equality,
etc.) would impact individual moral emotional development, particularly empathy,
shame, and guilt.  These moral emotions were further hypothesized to predict moral
judgment competence, defined as the cognitive reasoning ability to be consistent in the
application of moral principles across situations.  These hypothesized relationships were
tested in a structural equation model that represents the first known attempt to combine
moral developmental building blocks, moral emotions, and moral judgment competence.  
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REVIEW OF LITERATURE
“A moral being is one who is capable of comparing his past and future actions or
motives, and of approving or disapproving of them.”     -Charles Darwin
Morality and its development has entertained philosophers throughout time from
Aristotle to Aquinas to Descartes.  From a Western perspective, three philosophical
platforms have commonly been presented about the moral human condition.  First,
Christian doctrine presents humankind as being born with original sin, that is a proclivity
to concupiscence (Chadwick, 1991).  According to this viewpoint, individuals have a
wounded nature and need to be saved from sin as shown in Psalms 52: 4-7.
“Wash away all my guilt; from my sin cleanse me.  For I know my
offense; my sin is always before me.  Against you alone have I sinned; I
have done such evil in your sight that you are just in your sentence,
blameless when you condemn.  True, I was born guilty, a sinner, even
as my mother conceived me” (The New American Bible, 1992).    
The second philosophical platform, proposed by Swiss-born, French philosopher
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, was developed in opposition to the Christian view of original sin. 
Rousseau thought that humans were born good and for moral development to take place
little intervention was needed from parents and the community.  In fact, Rousseau felt
humans were lead astray by societal institutions, conceptualizing the ideal human as one
uncontaminated from society or what he termed the noble savage (Hergenhahn, 2001, p.
5184).  Rousseau considered society an interference with the natural, good human impulse
as shown in his work Emile (1762/1974) “God makes all things good; man meddles with
them and they become evil.” (pp. 5).  
The third philosophical platform, proposed by English philosopher John Locke, is
the idea that individuals are born amoral - neither good nor bad.  Locke proposed this
concept in opposition to church dogma of his time that taught morality as being innate
ideas originating from God.  Locke felt ideas were not innate (moral ideas, mathematical
ideas, theological ideas, or any ideas) and emphasized the value of experience.  Locke
proposed the idea of tabula rasa, which means “blank slate”, implying that morality was
completely derived by interactions with the environment (Hergenhahn, 2001; pp. 114-
119; pp.161; Locke, 1690).  These three early philosophical platforms inspired
psychologists to scientifically determine the nature of morality and its development.  
The first step in the psychologist’s scientific repertoire is theory building.  To
date, two predominate theoretical orientations of moral development have emerged -
social learning/social cognition (e.g., Bandura, 1977, 1986, 1990, 1991; Rotter, 1982;
Eisenberg & Fabes, 1988; Kurtines & Gewirtz 1991a, 1991b; Musser & Leone, 1986; see
Thomas, 1997 for a review) and cognitive structuralism (e.g., Kegan, 1982, Kohlberg,
1967, 1971, 1984; Piaget, 1965, 1973; Piaget & Inhelder, 1969; see Thomas, 1997 for a
review).  Both theoretical orientations posit the human condition as amoral (neither good
nor bad), thus stressing the importance of experience in moral development. 
Furthermore, both have a life-span approach with the strongest emphasis placed on the
first two decades of life (Thomas, 1997).  However, both are substantively unique and
will be individually explored in depth, looking first at the social learning/social cognition
6orientation.           
To understand different theoretical orientations, it is helpful to examine where the
orientation places its focus.  The social learning/social cognition orientation places focus
on the values (i.e., convictions) held by the group in which a person resides (e.g., a
family, a community, a nation).  “An individual value is a conviction a person holds
about good and bad ways to act towards others.  A shared value is such a conviction that
is held in common by a variety of people.” (Thomas, 1997, pp. 69).  Simple forms of
values/convictions are “the respect for life”, “the respect for other’s property”, and “the
importance of supporting others’ in their times of need” (Thomas, 1997, pp. 68).  In the
social learning/social cognition orientation, successful moral development is defined as
adopting the values/convictions of the group in which the individual belongs while
unsuccessful development involves continually engaging in behaviors with negative
consequences (i.e., the inability to learn from consequences).  The adoption of
values/convictions of the group is posited to most readily take place via environmental
modeling (Bandura, 1977, 1986, 1990, 1991).   
These values/convictions can then translate into behavior if put into action.  The
social learning/social cognition orientation does not outline specific behaviors as being
moral or immoral since it is relative to the social context.  There are, however, certain
common behaviors (i.e., common values/convictions translated into action) that reoccur
in societies such as the value of “the respect for life” translating into the behavior of “not
killing others” and the value of “the respect for other’s property” translating into the
behavior of “not stealing others’ things”.  According to the social learning/social
cognition orientation, these are not termed as moral behaviors per se but are a function of
7what societies across time have found works for successful communities (Kurtines &
Gewirtz 1991a, 1991b; Musser & Leone, 1986; Thomas, 1997).  Hence, the reoccurrence
of these behaviors across time shows that they are adaptive for a functioning community
irregardless of whether or not these behaviors are seen as moral.    
      Two additional unique aspects of the social learning/social cognition orientation
that will be explored  involve the conceptualization of personality and the
conceptualization of growth.  Personality is described as having rational and irrational
sources and an individual must find balance between them.  There are three rational
sources (values, prudential considerations, and ego-protection techniques) and one
irrational source (strong emotions such as shame, sympathy, guilt, fear, lust, etc.).  Values
are convictions held by an individual and were explored earlier (e.g., “upholding fairness,
justness, and preserving honesty”).  Prudential considerations involve reflection on
consequences of specific actions (e.g., receiving a poor grade on an exam) and ego-
protection techniques involve balancing any discrepancies between values and prudential
considerations (Bandura, 1977, 1986, 1990, 1991).  For instance, an individual may have
the prudential consideration that s/he did not study for an exam and will likely receive the
consequence of a failing grade.  The individual may want to avoid this negative
consequence by cheating on the exam.  However, this same individual also holds the
value of “upholding fairness, justness, and preserving honesty”.  Hence, an ego-protection
technique is needed to balance the discrepancy by either changing the individual’s value
(to allow cheating) or accepting the negative consequences of receiving a failing grade.  
Turning towards developmental growth, in the social learning/social cognition
orientation it is conceptualized as the gradual day-by-day accumulation of moral
8reasoning and understanding across the life-span with no sharp developmental trends. 
However, an emphasis is placed on the first two-decades of life as being highly influential
in moral development because it is felt subsequent development relies on this foundation
(Rotter, 1982; Eisenberg & Fabes, 1988).  This growth conceptualization as gradual
across the lifespan is unique from the stage conceptualization of growth (sharp
developmental trends) of the cognitive structuralism orientation.  However, before
describing the specifics of the cognitive structuralism conceptualization of growth, it is
helpful to examine where the orientation places its focus.               
Cognitive structuralism orientation places focus on the acquisition of rules, as
opposed to the social learning/social cognition orientation’s acquisition of values.  Hence,
successful moral development is then defined as the acquisition of rules instead of values. 
Rules can be thought of as external properties of the world, whether they be physical
properties like that of water or social interaction properties like that of a marital
relationship.  Rules are thought to be universal and distinct from the cultural-relativist
position of values in the social learning/social cognition orientation (Thomas, 1997).  To
further elaborate on the cognitive structuralism rules and how they compare to social
learning/social cognitive values, the theory of Jean Piaget (1896-1980) will be briefly
highlighted.  
Jean Piaget, the premiere cognitive structuralism theorist, felt morality was a
system of rules and each individual can be thought of as playing a game with the object
being to acquire the rules (Piaget, 1965, 1973; Piaget & Inhelder, 1969).  For instance,
Piaget theorized that children (ages of 7 through 11) are able to understand the physical
property that water is conserved (i.e., the same amount retained) when poured from one
9container to another regardless of the shape of the receiving container.  Even though this
example shows acquisition of a mental rule, Piaget felt mental development was the
foundation for subsequent moral reasoning (Piaget, 1965, 1973; Piaget & Inhelder, 1969). 
Another example illustrating cognitive structuralism rules is Piaget’s autonomous
morality.  Autonomous morality involves individuals basing moral judgments on mutual
regard, equality, and respect to guide their interactions with others (Piaget, 1965). 
Therefore, it is possible to see Piaget’s autonomous morality played out in marital
relationships as a spouse gathers rules or social properties from marital interactions such
as functioning with mutual regard, equality, and respect as shown in the rules “do not
commit adultery” and “do not abuse intimate power”.  However, even though
conceptualization differs, these rules or properties of the relationship can readily be
mapped onto the specific values of the social learning/social cognition orientation.  For
instance, the rules surrounding the ideas of equality and fairness such as “do not cheat”
and “do not steal” are extremely similar, if not identical, to the values of “upholding
fairness, justness, and preserving honesty” and “the respect for other’s property”.  In fact,
in a marital relationship, the value of “mutual regard ” thankfully overlaps with the rule
of “do not kill”.  In sum, it is important to note the theoretical focus of each orientation
rather than attempt to narrow down specific orthogonal rules and values for each.    
As mentioned previously, the cognitive structuralism orientation
conceptualization of development involves sharp developmental trends or stages of
development.  Typical stage progression in cognitive structuralism theories involve the
endorsement of equality and the releasing of self-centeredness.  Stage progression can
also be more generally framed as conforming to the prescribed thoughts/behaviors
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outlined by a theorist during a specific stage of development (Thomas, 1997).  Two of the
most renowned cognitive-structuralism stage theorists are Jean Piaget (highlighted
earlier) and Lawrence Kohlberg (1927-1987) and their theories will be detailed below.    
First, as alluded to earlier, Jean Piaget hypothesized that morality is a system of
acquiring different rules.  He proposed that this process is similar to the one that an
individual goes through when s/he is playing a new game.  The foundation for acquiring
these moral rules relies on cognitive abilities, which Piaget classified into developmental
stages.  The first stage is the sensorimotor period, lasting between birth to about 2 years
of age, with successful stage progression involving the mental representation of objects. 
The second stage is the preoperational-thought period, lasting between 2 to 7 years of
age, with successful stage progression involving a transition from perception-dependent
problem solving to the use of logic in problem solving.  The third stage is the concrete-
operations period, lasting between 7 to 11 years of age, with successful stage progression
involving mastery of the conservation of properties such as mass and volume.  The fourth
and final stage is the formal-operations period, lasting between 11 to 15 years of age,
with successful stage progression involving abstract reasoning and symbolic thought.  
Piaget hypothesized that individuals apply their current cognitive abilities to interact with
the environment and, subsequently, morals are acquired.  Cognitive abilities therefore
play a key role in moral development (Piaget, 1965, 1973; Piaget & Inhelder, 1969).      
Piaget also put forth specific stages of moral development that occur concurrently
with the cognitive stages of development.  The first stage heteronomous morality, lasting
between 4 to 7 years of age, is characterized by the unquestioning of authority and an
inflexible rule system.  The second stage is a transitional stage, lasting between 7 to 10
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years of age, where characteristics of the first and third stage are exhibited.  The third and
final stage autonomous morality, starting at 10 years of age, is characterized by more
flexibility in the rule system and ideas like justice, equality, and reciprocity are prevalent
(Piaget, 1965).           
Second, Lawrence Kohlberg had similar ideas to Piaget about moral development;
however, he developed a more detailed six stage model.  Kohlberg’s stage one
(heteronomous morality), like Piaget’s, involves unquestioning acceptance of authorities’
rules while stage two (individualistic, instrumental morality) involves the maximization
of benefits to the self while minimizing negative consequences.  Stage three
(impersonally normative morality) involves shared social norms of interaction while stage
four (social system morality) involves pursuing the common good.  At stage five (human-
rights and social-welfare morality), people begin to promote universal values and rights
while at stage six (morality of universalizable, reversible, and prescriptive general
ethical principles) positive prescriptions are typically given such as “respect for human
dignity” and “a quality life for everyone” (Kohlberg, 1967, 1971, 1984).  
As can be seen, both Piaget’s and Kohlberg’s stage theories rely heavily on
internal cognitive processing.  A key feature of the cognitive structuralism orientation as a
whole is the emphasis on mental phenomena.  For example, personality for the cognitive
structuralism orientation is divided into three parts: cognitive structures, schemas, and
operation mechanisms.  First, cognitive structures are malleable views of the world based
on current maturation.  Cognitive structures can be thought of as developmental “lenses”. 
Second, schemas are adaptable storage blocks of information used to relate to the world. 
As an individual relates to the world, new information is incorporated into these storage
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blocks which, in turn, affect moral behavior.  Finally, operation mechanisms are the skills
used to adapt and change schemes when new information is presented (Thomas, 1997). 
In conclusion, both the social learning/social cognition orientation and the
cognitive structuralism orientation have had a profound impact in shaping the field of
moral development today.  Both approach the scientific study of moral development in a
dynamic way.  Social learning/social cognition focuses on contextual factors while
cognitive structuralism focuses on conscious mental operations.  Another difference is
that cognitive structuralism theories do not cite emotion as a salient factor in moral
development as do the social learning/social cognition theories as seen in the irrational
personality component (i.e., shame, sympathy, guilt, fear, lust, etc.).  Both orientations
also differ in research practice.  Cognitive structuralism theorists tend to investigate what
individuals would do rationally in a hypothetical situation (i.e., tapping cognitive
processes) while social learning/social cognition theorists tend to address the possible
difference between rational thought and actual behavior in real-life situations, with the
source of that difference being emotionality (Thomas, 1997).  For instance, a cognitive
structuralism theorist may have someone complete a questionnaire asking her or his
reactions and judgments in a hypothetical situation while a social learning/social
cognition theorist may assess someone’s reactions to a situation and compare them to
actual behavior in the real-life situation.  Even though it may appear that social
learning/social cognition theorists form a bridge across the two areas of thought, the
rational assessment of reactions prior to real-life observations is still from a social
learning/social cognition framework rather than a cognitive structuralism framework. 
Currently, the field of moral development has shifted from a focus on cognitive
13
processes and judgments like that seen in the cognitive structuralism orientation to a
focus on emotions and cultural influences like that seen in the social learning/social
cognition orientation.  For example, early prominent moral development theorists in the
field included Piaget and Kohlberg who were cognitive structuralists studying rational,
cognitive judgments.  As time went on, the field has turned the focus towards emotions
(e.g., empathy), gender differences, prosocial behaviors (e.g., helping, giving), and
cultural influences (see Turiel, 2006 for a review).  Even though the current direction of
the field is towards the social learning/social cognition theoretical orientation, it is
thought that advancement in the field could be attained by bridging the theoretical
orientations of cognitive structuralism and social learning/social cognition.  By
integrating previously separated areas of research, greater complexity is achieved and a
closer approximation of human life is simulated.          
Thus, the central goal of the present study is to uniquely integrate both theoretical
orientations of social learning/social cognition and cognitive structuralism in the
construction of a structural equation model of moral development.  However, before
describing the model in detail, the primary outcome variable of the current study - moral
judgment competence as measured by the Moral Judgment Test - will be discussed.
Measuring Moral Development Empirically: The Moral Judgment Test  
The Moral Judgment Test (MJT; Lind, 2005, 2006, in press; Lind & Wakenhut,
1985) was designed to bridge the gap between theory and measurement in the area of
moral development.  In the mid-seventies, Georg Lind, a German Professor of
psychology, postulated the dual-aspect theory which delineates the idea that moral
development is composed of both principles (i.e., moral attitudes/values) and the
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application of those principles (i.e., cognitive abilities/capacities).  Yet, the moral
development research measures available at the time only measured moral attitudes
according to Lind.  Hence, Lind sought to develop a measure to assess moral
development that would not only evaluate individual moral attitudes but also moral
cognitive abilities.  This quest resulted in the development of the Moral Judgment Test
(MJT).  Lind noted several theoretical influences in the design and construction of the
MJT, some of which were E. Brunswick’s diacritical method (1955), N. Anderson’s
cognitive algebra (1991), G. Kelly’s personal constructs (1955), and L. Guttman’s facet
analysis (1961).  Since its inception, the Moral Judgment Test has been used in research
for over 30 years, has 29 foreign language versions, and has been administered to over
38,000 participants across the globe (Lind, 2004, 2005, in press; Lind & Wakenhut,
1985).  
In order to measure cognitive abilities, Lind thought a difficult moral task must be
presented.  The MJT presents participants with moral dilemmas which are narrative
stories where the dilemma arises because the situation involves the transgression of
important moral values or principles.  Participants then must make a decision about the
acceptability of the person’s action in the dilemma and the acceptability of arguments for
and against that action.  For example, in the Doctor’s Dilemma of the MJT (see Appendix
F) participants judge the acceptability of euthanasia.  There are several moral principles
that could be violated such as “The preservation of life”, “Helping someone in need”,
“Upholding the law”, and “The quality of life”.  The MJT asks participants to rate their
agreement with someone’s actions in the situation and then rate the acceptability of
arguments for and against the person’s behavior.  The arguments for and against the
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person’s behavior directly relate to Lawrence Kohlberg’s six stage model of moral
development.  Each stage is equally represented with one pro and one con argument per
stage for a total of twelve arguments per dilemma.  Most importantly, the presentation of
arguments and judging both pro and con arguments is inherent in creating a challenging
moral task of cognitive ability (Lind, 2005, in press; Lind & Wakenhut, 1985).  
Lawrence Kohlberg’s influence is also seen in the conceptual definition behind
the MJT.  The MJT uses the same definition that Lawrence Kohlberg used for moral
judgment competence which was “the capacity to make decisions and judgments which
are moral (i.e., based on internal principles) and to act in accordance with such
judgments” (Kohlberg, 1964, p.425).  In other words, the ability to be consistent in the
application of moral principles in moral judgments results in moral judgment
competence.  Hence, the MJT is designed to measure the construct moral judgment
competence which involves the cognitive reasoning ability to be consistent in the
application of moral principles across situations.    
Closer examination of the MJT’s Doctor’s Dilemma reveals how one could
consistently apply her or his moral principles, resulting in a higher moral judgment
competence score on the test.  For example, Kohlberg’s stage six (morality of
universalizable, reversible, and prescriptive general ethical principles), involving
positive prescriptions and typically encompassing principles such as “respect for human
dignity” and “a quality life for everyone”, is represented within two arguments concerning
the doctor’s action of committing euthanasia.  One argument is worded in favor of the
action and one argument is worded against the action.  The pro argument reads “because
the doctor had to act according to his conscience.  The woman’s condition justified an
16
exception to the moral obligation to preserve life.”  The con argument reads “because the
protection of life is everyone’s highest moral obligation.  We have no clear moral criteria
for distinguishing between mercy killing and murder.”  If an individual has a
principle/value from Kohlberg’s stage 6 moral reasoning such as “respect for human
dignity” then s/he should accept both arguments to relatively the same degree even
though they are opposing arguments.  Stated differently, regardless of her or his opinion
of the doctor’s actions, a high level of moral judgment competence would result in
endorsing both arguments similarly (e.g., +3 and +4 “I strongly accept” rather than -4 “I
strongly reject” and +3 “I strongly accept” for pro and con arguments, respectively).  
The actual scoring of the MJT is rather unique compared to most questionnaires
that involve simple sum scores.  The MJT is scored by calculating a global index of moral
development.  MJT scoring results in a C-score (or C-index or C) defined as moral
judgment competence which is derived by intraindividual variation in responding using
MANOVA calculations.  Hence, the moral judgment competence score reflects the ability
to be consistent in the application of moral principles because it is a measure of that
variance.  The C-score can range from 1 to 100 and can be categorized as falling into one
of six different areas: (1-9) very low, (10-19) low, (20-29) medium, (30-39) high, (40-49)
very high and (above 50) extraordinarily high (Lind, in press).  The mean C-score for
each collected sample should be within the range of 10 and 40 (Lind, 2006).  
To reiterate, the more inconsistent an individual is in the application of her or his
moral principles’ (e.g., stage inconsistency), the lower that individual’s moral judgment
competence score (Lind, 2005, in press; Lind & Wakenhut, 1985).  Figure 1 shows two
fictitious participants’ data from rating one dilemma in order to display the patterns that
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would result in a low C-score and a high C-score (from Lind, 2006).  As can be seen,
across rows (or within stages), when items are rated more similarly across pro and con
arguments (i.e., principles from that stage are more consistently applied), a larger C-score
results.       
It is important to point out that the MJT does not rely on classical test theory with
the typical psychometric property of internal reliability.  Internal reliability does not apply
to the MJT since variance in responses is the theoretical construct of interest rather than
some property of the test to be minimized (Lind, 2005, in press; Lind & Wakenhut,
1985).  Figure 2 shows an example calculation of one fictitious participant’s ratings on
the MJT and the calculations behind the C-score.  As can be seen, there are nine major
steps in the MANOVA or the calculation of the C-score: (1) summation of arguments for
each stage; (2) squaring the stage sums, (3) total sum; (4) summing step two; (5) sum of
squares; (6) step three squared divided by 24; (7) step five minus step six; (8) step four
divided by 4 minus step six; and (9) step 8 divided by step 7 times 100.  This fictitious
participant had a moral judgment competence score of 34.76 which would be categorized
as high.       
The C-score of the MJT is strictly a calculation of moral judgment competence
and not a calculation of other types of participant response consistency or inconsistency. 
For instance, if a participant were to consistently rate all items on the test the same score
this would not inflate her or his C-score.  In fact, this would result in a very low C-score. 
At first glance, this statement would seem counterintuitive because by rating all items the
same score, stage consistency is achieved.  However, stage consistency is not the only
factor to consider when examining MJT scores.  Additionally, two theoretical facets of
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Kohlberg’s six stage model need to be taken into consideration: (1) stage order preference
and (2) stage quasi-simplex structure.  First, stage order preference involves the
preference of moral reasoning in the order of stage number such that 6 is preferred over 5
and 5 is preferred over 4 and so on with 6 being the highest and 1 being the lowest. 
Second, stage quasi-simplex structure involves the correlation between neighboring
stages such as stages 4 and 5 should have a higher degree of correlation than more distant
stages such as 4 and 6.  Both of these structures have consistently been found in research
using Kohlberg’s six stage model (Kohlberg, 1958; Lind, 2005, in press; Lind &
Wakenhut, 1985; Rest, 1979; Walker, 1986).  In other words, Kohlberg’s six stage model
is arranged in a hierarchy with stage 1 being the lowest stage of cognitive reasoning and
stage 6 being the highest stage of cognitive reasoning.  Hence, if these structures do not
emerge, then the participant is not able to differentiate the quality of arguments in the
hierarchy.  The C-score does not involve weighting scores according to Kohlberg’s stages
in the MANOVA calculation; however, if a participant showed no or little differentiation
or variation in responses across stages that would result in a lower C-score.  For instance,
if a participant rated all arguments as “+4", which would actually be highly consistent in
regards to stage, this would result in a C-score of 0.  A C-score of 0 would be due to the
lack of variance in the MANOVA calculation or, theoretically, the participant’s lack of
cognitive ability to differentiation between the moral quality of arguments.  Even C-
scores that are not 0 but are relatively low have the same characteristics.            
Besides judging the acceptability of arguments, it was also noted that participants
initially rate their opinion of the action in the dilemma.  This opinion rating is not used to
calculate the C-score.  In fact, moral judgment competence is defined as the ability to
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judge the moral quality of arguments irrespective of personal opinion of the situation. 
Thus, moral competence is not a function of opinion agreement.  It is the ability to judge
the moral quality of arguments regardless of the particular stance an individual takes in 
the dilemma (Lind, 2005, in press; Lind & Wakenhut, 1985).  In other words, the C-score
measures the degree to which an individuals’ judgments are determined by moral
principles rather than by other psychological forces like the human tendency to make
arguments agree with one’s opinion or decision about a certain issue (Lind, 2005, 2006,
in press; Lind & Wakenhut, 1985).    
Even though C-score calculations are independent of opinion ratings, there are
other indexes calculated from the MJT which take participant opinion under
consideration such as the C+ index and the PC-Index.  The C+ index is an adjusted
version of the original C-score.  Research has shown that even individuals with very high
moral judgment competence scores tend to rate counter-arguments slightly lower than
supportive arguments which would result in the inability to obtain the maximum C-score
of 100 (Lind, 2006).  The C+ index was developed to remedy this problem.  However, the
correlation between the C+ index and the original C-score is very high (r > 0.95) and,
therefore, the adjusted index is rarely used (Lind, 2006).  The PC-Index is a squared
multiple correlation involving the relationship between pro and con ratings, factoring in
participant opinion.  This is also an optional index calculation which indicates if the
participant is responding in the same manner to the pro and con items.  However, the
present study’s main focus is moral judgment competence and, as such, only the C-score
is calculated.   
In summary, the Moral Judgment Test (MJT) is an innovative measure of moral
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development.  It has seen strong global popularity with multiple language translations and
numerous cross-cultural validation studies (Lind, 2005, in press).  The theoretical,
structural, and scoring distinctions of the MJT cause the measure to be very appealing to
moral development researchers.  Hence, the present study will apply the MJT, with moral
judgment competence as the major outcome variable, in the construction of a structural
equation model of moral development.  Prior to current model presentation, previous
research using structural equation models in the realm of moral development will briefly
be reviewed.      
Previous Structural Equation Models of Moral Development
Past research has utilized the statistical techniques of structural equation modeling
in order to explore moral development from a multi-construct perspective.  Practical
applications of structural equation modeling in the field of moral development has been
seen in such areas as the medical field, with moral reasoning in medical residents
(Sheehan et al., 1985), and the business world, with moral commitment in employee
turnover rates (Jaros, Jermier, Koehler, & Sincich, 1993).  An additional application in
the field of marketing has been noted with a study that explored marketing ethical
dilemmas, moral philosophies, and religiosity (Singhapakdi, Vitell, & Franke, 1999). 
However, there is no one universal structural equation model for moral development
researchers.  In fact, there are only a handful of moral development studies that have been
conducted which utilize this statistical technique and many of the constructs that compose
the models do not overlap.  
For example, Matsueda (1989) used structural equation modeling to explore tenth-
grade boys’ minor deviance and moral beliefs (e.g., Question: “Is this a good thing for
1     The social learning/social cognition theoretical orientation actually developed out of
the social learning theory tradition.  The major distinction is the social learning/social
cognition’s new addition of cognition such that individuals learn from their environment
not only through modeling and consequences but also from reflecting on their past,
present, and future actions as well as the actions of others.   
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people to do?”; Rate on 6-point Likert scale: “Not copying during a test even though
others in the class are copying”).  Over and above other relationships in the model, such
as socioeconomic status, the results showed that moral beliefs had a strong inverse
relationship with minor deviance.  Compared to the use of the Moral Judgment Test
(Lind, 2005, 2006, in press; Lind & Wakenhut, 1985) in the current study, Matsueda’s
three simple moral belief items, such as the one shown above, cannot be extrapolated as a
measure of moral cognitive ability as can the C-score from the Moral Judgment Test. 
Thus, the novel use of the Moral Judgment Test within a structural equation model is a
strength of the current study.    
Another example using an adolescent sample is Benda’s work (Benda, Musticchi-
Hogg, & Benda, 2000; Benda, 2002) which uses structural equation modeling to explore
violence and religion.  Across both studies, Benda and colleagues found that, in general,
religious expression was inversely related to violence.  Similar to the present study, one
of the theoretical orientations behind Benda and colleagues’ structural equation model
was social learning theory.  What is unique about the present study is that the theoretical
orientation of social learning/social cognition  is applied as well as that of cognitive1
structuralism such that the present structural equation model attempts to bridge the
theoretical gap between the two orientations.  
While some moral development researchers have focused on the period of
adolescence, others have conducted research with a focus on the early portion of the
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lifespan.  For instance, Aksan and Kochanska (2005) explored a structural equation
model in the context of toddler gaze (33 and 45 months) with moral emotions (guilt and
empathic distress) and rule-compatible conduct (maternal prohibitions and another adults’
rules).  Aksan and Kochanska found support for their two factor model (what they termed
“conscience in childhood”) and also found that the structure was stable over time.  Like
Aksan and Kochanska, the current study explores the moral emotions of guilt and
empathic distress.  However, the assessment of these emotions are in the form of self-
report questionnaires on college-aged participants.  
King and Furrow (2004) tested a structural equation model with constructs such as
religion (religious importance, attendance importance, and number of attendance), social
interactions (parents and friends), social capital (access to actual and potential
relationships/acquaintances such as within an institutionalized environment as school)
and moral outcomes (empathic concern, perspective taking, and altruism) during
adolescence (ages 13 to 19 years).  King and Furrow found that religiously active youth
had higher levels of social capital resources and social capital resources served as a
mediation variable between religiousness and moral outcomes.  
The present study is similar to King and Furrow’s (2004) study in that both
empathic concern and perspective taking are measured and they are measured by the same
instrument, Davis’ Interpersonal Reactivity Index (1983; see Appendix D as well as
Chapter III: Methodology).  Furthermore, the current study measures family functioning
(health/competence, conflict, cohesion, leadership, and emotional expressiveness) which
can at the very least be considered in a similar vein as that of family social interactions as
measured by King and Furrow.  Thus, other researchers have considered family
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influences important in moral development.  King and Furrow also measured the social
interaction of friends, deeming their influences important in moral development.  The
current study measures the influence of friends in moral thought via White’s Revised
Moral Authority Scale (1997; see Appendix C as well as Chapter III: Methodology).  
A major difference between the current study and King and Furrow’s study
(2004), as well as other studies that have explored religion, is a bias towards either Judeo-
Christian ideals or the institution of organized religion or both in the measurement of
religion.  Not all religions involve the Westernized idea of organized, attended services as
a indicator of one’s religiousness (e.g., certain Native American tribes, certain sects of
Buddhism, etc.).  The current study sought to measure one’s spiritual life rather than
religiosity which is not rooted in a particular religion or tied to an organized institution. 
One’s spiritual life is defined as an individual’s personal relationship with a higher power
and behaviors and thoughts associated with that relationship.  Spiritual life is measured
by Hatch, Burg, Naberhaus, and Hellmich’s Spiritual Involvement and Beliefs Scale-
Revised (1998; see Appendix B as well as Chapter III: Methodology).  However, the
influence of organized religion in moral development is also not discounted and is likely
to be a strong influence in moral development.  Hence, the present study also assessed the
amount of moral ascription individuals give the influence of their church/religion, as
measured by the White’s Revised Moral Authority Scale (1997; see Appendix C as well
as Chapter III: Methodology).          
Lastly, Derryberry and Thoma (2005) used structural equation modeling to
explore moral judgments, four types of self-concept, and three types of moral behaviors
(honesty, altruism, and taking a stand for civil liberties) in college students.  To explore
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moral judgments, Rest’s Defining Issues Test (DIT; Rest et al., 1999b) was used which is
similar to Lind’s Moral Judgment Test (MJT; Lind, 2005, 2006, in press; Lind &
Wakenhut, 1985) because moral dilemmas are presented with some items corresponding
to Kohlberg’s six stages of moral reasoning.  However, the DIT is theoretically and
structurally distinct as well as scored differently from the MJT.   Derryberry and Thoma
found that the three forms of moral actions were conceptually distinct and differentially
related to the variables of self-understanding and moral judgments.  
The current study is similar to Derryberry and Thoma (2005) in that a measure of
moral judgments is used where college students respond to moral dilemmas with items
that have a relationship to Kohlberg’s six stages of moral reasoning.  Furthermore,
Derryberry and Thoma also measured the moral action of “taking a stand for civil
liberties” which can be considered in a similar vein as the current study assessing the
amount of moral ascription individuals give the influences of “social equality” and “a
greater good for society”, as measured by White’s Revised Moral Authority Scale (1997;
see Appendix C as well as Chapter III: Methodology).  A major difference between the
current study and Derryberry and Thoma’s study is the distinction between the MJT and
the DIT.  Generally, the MJT is considered an assessment of moral cognitive abilities
rather than just moral attitudes, which is what the DIT is considered to measure (see Lind
2005, in press; Lind & Wakenhut, 1985 for a detailed discussion and Rest, 1997 for a
rebuttal).  Hence, the application of an instrument that assesses moral cognitive abilities
draws distinction to the current study.                
In conclusion, past researchers have sought to understand moral development by
utilizing a multi-construct perspective, and structural equation modeling is currently the
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best statistical method for this approach.  Practical application of this research has been
seen in the medical, business, and marketing fields.  However, only a handful of these
research studies have been conducted and models typically have few overlapping
constructs.  Thus, exploring moral development using this higher level statistical
technique, as well as drawing from the constructs of past studies, are strengths of the
current study.  Keeping past research in mind, the current structural equation model will
next be described.          
Current Structural Equation Model of Moral Development
The current structural equation model is unique in several respects and will be
explained in detail (refer to Figure 3 for a visual representation of the constructs).  First,
two types of influences are explored in the prediction of moral judgment competence -
developmental influences and emotional influences.  Second, the current model can be
mapped onto the lifespan such that as progression towards the prediction of the outcome
variable of moral judgment competence occurs, the corresponding constructs occur at
later points in the lifespan. Third, the model integrates two previously separated
theoretical orientations, social learning/social cognition and cognitive structuralism, in an
attempt to advance the field of moral development.     
 The present model predicting moral judgment competence can be divided into
developmental and emotional influences.  The three developmental influences (also
called early building blocks of moral development) explored in the present model are (1)
family functioning, (2) spiritual life, and (3) ascription to moral authority sources (e.g.,
friends, family).  The inclusion of these three constructs in a model predicting moral
development is supported by the previously reviewed research (e.g., Benda 2002 and
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Benda, Mustcchi-Hogg, & Benda, 2002 for spiritual life as well as King & Furrow, 2004
for family functioning, spiritual life, and ascription to moral authority sources) as well as
research that has shown links between prosocial behavior (i.e., moral behavior) and
family, friends, and religious influences (e.g., see Eisenberg & Morris, 2004 for a
review).  The three emotional influences (also called moral emotions) explored in the
present model are (1) empathy, (2) shame, and (3) guilt.  The inclusion of these three
constructs in a model predicting moral development is supported because the emotions of
guilt, shame and empathy are cited by researchers as being the main emotions in moral
development (for a review see Eisenberg, 2000).  
The current model can also be mapped onto the lifespan such that as progression
towards the outcome variable of moral judgment competence occurs, the corresponding
constructs occur at later points in the lifespan.  Not unlike their labels, the three early
moral developmental building blocks are theorized to exert their influence in the early
portion of the lifespan.  It is from these foundational pieces that subsequent moral
variables are predicted in the model.  Next, out of these early moral developmental
building blocks, it is theorized that moral emotions in young adulthood are fostered (this
will be detailed in a moment).  Lastly, all three moral emotions are theorized to predict
the outcome variable of moral judgment competence (i.e., cognitive development), which
is being fostered into young adulthood by indirect developmental influences and direct
emotional influences.   
The theoretical claim that early moral developmental building blocks foster the
development of moral emotions may at first seem contrary to previous research. 
Emotional development is typically seen as something that takes place early in
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development rather than later in development such as with the formation of temperament
(Chess & Thomas, 1977; Thomas & Chess, 1991) and emotional regulation (Rothbart &
Bates, 1998) in infancy.  In fact, the formation of the specific moral emotions of guilt and
empathy have been shown in early development (Aksan & Kochanska, 2005; reviewed
earlier).  Further evidence, such as infant reactive crying and mimicry, also suggests an
early formation of empathy (see Eisenberg, Fabes, & Spinrad, 2006 for a review).  The
current model, however, assesses moral emotions in young adulthood.  There is evidence
to suggest discontinuity as well as some continuity across the lifespan between infancy to
young adulthood in emotionality and emotional regulation (Block, 1993).  The
discontinuity in emotionality across the lifespan is likely attributed to outside
environmental influences shaping emotional development.  The current study
hypothesizes that these intervening environmental influences which foster moral
emotions are family functioning, spiritual life, and ascription to moral authority sources.    
The final way the current model is unique is that it integrates two previously
separated theoretical orientations, social learning/social cognition and cognitive
structuralism, in an attempt to advance the field of moral development.  The predictive
links between the moral emotions and moral judgment competence are the theoretical
bridge between social learning/social cognition and cognition structuralism.  The Moral
Judgment Test (Lind, 2005, 2006, in press; Lind & Wakenhut, 1985), assessing moral
judgment competence, is strongly aligned with cognitive structuralism due to the
presentation of cognitive, rational dilemmas and the representation of Kohlberg’s six
stages of moral reasoning.  The early building blocks of moral development and the moral
emotions are strongly aligned with the social learning/social cognition orientation due to
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the focus on emotionality, environmental context, and real-life experiences.  Hence, these
unique, predictive links between the moral emotions and moral judgment competence are
the first attempt to bridge these distinct areas of thought.  
The current theoretically integrative lifespan model of developmental and
emotional influences predicting moral judgment competence is displayed in Figure 3.  In
typical structural equation model fashion, latent variables (or constructs) are displayed in
ellipses with arrows between those ellipses which represents the structural model while
boxes underneath each latent represent its measure (or indicators) which constitutes the
measurement model.  The predicted direction of effect for each parameter estimate is
represented as either a “+” or “-” symbol.  As can be seen in Figure 3, the three
developmental influences are displayed on the far left - dysfunctional family life, spiritual
life, and ascription to moral authority sources.  Family functioning has been labeled as
dysfunctional family life (which is the inability for a family to function properly) because
dysfunctional families have been shown to differentially relate to the three moral
emotions of interest in the present study.  The double-headed curved arrows between the
three developmental influence variables represent correlations among the latent variables. 
Turning to the conceptual definition of each of the developmental influences,
dysfunctional family life is defined as involving regular stereotyped relational patterns as
well as consistent themes across family life which are negative and unhealthy.  To
understand unhealthy patterns, a major dimension of functional families is health and
competence which involves themes such as happiness, optimism, problem-solving and
negotiation skills, family love, minimal blaming, and autonomy.  Dysfunctional families,
on the other hand, more often exhibit the polar opposites of these themes such as sadness,
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negativity, poor problem-solving and negotiation skills, inconsistent or absent love,
blaming, and dependency.  Other dimensions of functional family life include conflict,
cohesion, leadership, and emotional expressiveness.  Dysfunctional families tend to
exhibit the negative patterns within these dimensions.  For instance, in dysfunctional
families the dimension of conflict involves themes of overt unresolved conflict, fighting,
and arguing.  Cohesion involves themes of dissatisfaction, lack of togetherness, and
disconnection.  Leadership involves themes of the absence of strong and consistent adult
leadership in the family.  Lastly, emotional expressiveness involves themes of little or no
feelings of closeness, little or no physical and verbal expressions of positive feelings, and
the unease in the expression of warmth and caring by family members (Beavers &
Hampson, 1990).  
Spiritual life is defined as an individual’s personal relationship with a higher
power and behaviors and thoughts associated with that relationship.  Spiritual life in the
current study is not associated with any particular religion in order to be accessible to
every participant.  In a similar vein, spiritual life is also not associated with an organized
institution such that spiritual life becomes defined as how often one attends religious
services rather than a personal relationship with a higher power.  A main dimension of
spiritual life is core spirituality.  Core spirituality is characterized by a connection with a
higher power/nature, ritual involvement, the ability to have faith, a sense of meaning,
involvement in a community/talking with someone about faith, and spiritual experiences. 
Other dimensions of spiritual life include existential activities, personal application, and
insight.  Existential activities involve meditation, spiritual perspective, and reflecting on
the meaning of life.  Personal application involves the application of humility and
2     The sources of religious/church and governmental institutions were added for the
current study and were not a part of White’s original scale.  It was thought that these were
salient sources of authority for moral development which needed to be represented.     
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applying spirituality in day-to-day living.  Insight involves the ability to accept things
which cannot be changed (Hatch, Burg, Naberhaus, & Hellmich, 1998).  
The last developmental influence, ascription to moral authority sources, is defined
as the individual attributed level of influence to different sources of moral authority in
moral decision making.  In other words, ascription to moral authority sources is what
persons and/or groups are having an impact on the individual’s moral decision making. 
Sources of moral authority influence include (a) self-interest, (b) family, (c) teachers,
friends, and the media, (d) society’s welfare, (e) equality (f) religious/church institutions,
and (g) governmental institutions  (White, 1997).2
As shown in Figure 3, the three emotional influences are represented in the
middle ellipses - empathy, shame, and guilt.  Moral development researchers most often
cite the moral emotions of empathy, shame, and guilt as being the main emotions in
moral development (for a review see Eisenberg, 2000).  Thus, empathy, shame, and guilt
were deemed appropriate moral emotions to include in the current model.  The moral
emotion of empathy is defined as separate but related dispositional tendencies of
perspective taking, empathic concern, personal distress, and fantasizing.  Perspective
taking involves the tendency to spontaneously adopt another’s point of view.  Empathic
concern involves the tendency to experience feelings of compassion for unfortunate
others.  Personal distress involves the tendency to experience distress and discomfort in
response to others in extreme distress.  Fantasizing involves the tendency to imaginatively
transpose oneself into fictional situations (Davis, 1983, 1996). 
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The remaining two emotional influences of shame and guilt are highly similar yet
are distinct, separate emotions.  Conceptually, shame and guilt are often associated with
the acquisition of moral principles and both have additional similarities such as negative
valance and internal attributions (Tangeny & Dearing, 2002).  However, guilt and shame
have been shown to represent distinct concepts (e.g., Baldwin, Baldwin, & Ewald, 2006;
Eisenberg, 2000; Tangeny & Dearing, 2002).  Hence, the current model defines shame as
a painful, negative, global evaluation of the self with associated feelings of worthlessness
and powerlessness.  A person who is shamed has the desire to hide, escape or strike back. 
Shame is typically more devastating and painful than guilt.  Guilt, on the other hand, is
defined as generally less painful than shame because guilt is associated with a specific
behavior rather than the self-concept.  Feeling of guilt, however, can be painful and
accompanied with nagging preoccupations with the specific transgression causing wishes
about how the transgression hadn’t occurred.  Associated feelings with guilt are tension,
remorse, and regret, and a person who is experiencing guilt has the desire to confess,
apologize, or repair (Tangeny & Dearing, 2002). 
The last latent variable in Figure 3, located on the far right side of the model, is
the outcome variable of moral judgment competence.  Moral judgment competence, its
meaning and measurement, has already been discussed at length (see Measuring Moral
Development Empirically: The Moral Judgment Test of this section) and will not be
detailed here.  However, to reiterate, moral judgment competence is defined as the
cognitive reasoning ability to be consistent in the application of moral principles across
situations.  A summary of all seven key constructs, their definitions, the instrument that
measures them, and their indicators in the measurement model are presented in Table 1.    
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   As can be seen in Figure 3, the measurement model is represented under each
latent variable as a box containing single capital letters or numbers.  Focusing first on the
three developmental influences, the measurement model will be described.  Underneath
each of the developmental influence latent variables are abbreviations of the sub-scales
from each questionnaire that were used to measure the abstract latent variables or
concepts.  Each one is called an indicator.  The latent variable of dysfunctional family life
has five indicators (H, F, C, L, and E) which correspond to the measurement sub-scales of
the Self-Report Family Inventory Version II (Health/Competence, ConFlict, Cohesion,
Leadership, and Expressiveness).  Next, the latent variable of spiritual life has four
indicators (C, E, H, and A) which correspond to the measurement sub-scales of the
Spiritual Involvement and Beliefs Scale-Revised (Core Spirituality, Spiritual
Perspective/Existential, Personal Application/Humility, and Acceptance/Insight).  Lastly,
the latent variable of ascription to moral authority sources has seven indicators (S, F, T,
W, E, R, and G) which correspond to the measurement sub-scales of the Revised Moral
Authority Scale (Self-Interest, Family, “Teachers, Friends, and the Media”, Society’s
Welfare, Equality, Religious/Church Institutions, and Government Institutions).  
Continuing with the measuring model, indicators are also shown for the three
emotional influences (empathy, shame, and guilt) shown in the middle of the model and
the outcome variable (moral judgment competence) shown on the far right of the model. 
The latent variable of empathy has four indicators (P, C, D, and F) which correspond to
the measurement sub-scales of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Perspective Taking,
Empathic Concern, Personal Distress, and Fantasy).  Next, the latent variable of shame
has eleven indicators (1 through 11) which correspond to the item numbers on the Test of
33
Self-Conscious Affect 3-Short Version.  Similarly, the latent variable of guilt has eleven
indicators as well (1 through 11) which correspond to the item numbers on the Test of
Self-Conscious Affect 3-Short Version.  Lastly, the latent variable of moral judgment
competence has one indicator (C) which corresponds to the C-score on the Moral
Judgment Test.  Again, each of the seven constructs, the definitions of the constructs, the
measures, and the indicators are summarized in Table 1.               
As noted earlier, the double-headed curved arrows between the three
developmental influence variables represent correlations between the latent variables. 
The three developmental influences or early building blocks of moral development are
hypothesized to be intercorrelated due to the common context of the home environment
during early childhood experiences.  There has been no known empirical research to date
on the relationships among these three specific variables.  However, adults shamed in
childhood as the result of dysfunctional families have been more likely to exhibit
problems forming healthy relationships with others’ as seen in therapeutic work
(Middelton-Moz, 1990).  Hence, it is hypothesized that the construct of dysfunctional
family life will have a negative correlation with both spiritual life (i.e., the relationship
with a higher power) and ascription to moral authority sources (i.e., the relationship to
society, family, teachers, peers, etc.).  In other words, individuals coming from
dysfunctional families will have a maladaptive way of relating to the world.  This
ineffective interaction with the world is often expressed in therapy as “not receiving the
manual for life” (Middelton-Moz, 1990).  The constructs of spiritual life and ascription to
moral authority sources are hypothesized to have a positive correlation because of the
overlap in construct domains (i.e., a higher power is considered the ultimate moral
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authority source).                  
Next, the developmental influence of dysfunctional family life is hypothesized to
predict the moral emotions of empathy and shame as represented by the straight, single-
headed arrows going into each predicted latent (see Figure 3).  Specifically, it is predicted
that higher amounts of reported dysfunctional family life will be predictive of lower
amounts of reported empathy and higher amounts of reported shame.  Of note,
dysfunctional family life is not hypothesized to predict the moral emotion of guilt. 
Research has shown that individuals from dysfunctional families are more likely
to express shame, but not guilt, in adulthood (Pulakos, 1996).  It has been suggested that
dysfunctional families are far from society’s ideal family life and; hence, more shame
develops as a result of this discrepancy (Hadley, Holloway, & Mallinckrodt, 1993). 
Furthermore, parents from dysfunctional families express fewer emotions, reinforce
emotions less, and inadequately respond to emotions (see meta-emotion structure theory
in family communication, Gottman, Katz, & Hooven, 1997); therefore, it is hypothesized
that empathy will be lower in individuals coming from these families since empathy
requires understanding others’ emotions and responding to them. 
The next developmental influence variable in the structural model, spiritual life,
predicts all three of the emotional influence variables of empathy, shame, and guilt.  With
regard to predicting empathy from spiritual life, research has shown a positive association
between these two variables across several different groups of individuals such as
members of the clergy, moral exemplars, college students, and the general population
(i.e., individuals from none of the previously mentioned groups; Oliner, 2005).  Other
research has also found spiritual growth to be associated with increased empathy and
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compassion for oneself and others (Noble, 2000).  Thus, it was hypothesized that higher
levels of reported spirituality will be predictive of higher levels of reported empathy.     
Next, spiritual life is hypothesized to predict shame.  The link between spirituality
and shame can be seen in therapy techniques as well as research.  For instance, Richards,
Hardman, and Berrett (2007) describe a variety of spiritual interventions for individual,
group, and family therapy with patients who have eating disorders with one of the results
being a decrease in the feelings of shame and unworthiness in the patients.  This inverse
relationship between spirituality and shame is also seen in research.  Research has shown
that spirituality can serve as a buffer against shame in female childhood sexual abuse
survivors (Valentine & Feinauer, 1993).  Additionally, research has shown that the
subgroup of women who significantly emotionally suffer after an abortion, experiencing
shame and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms, are able to decrease both
their shame and PTSD symptoms with a spiritually based grief intervention group, with
80% citing spirituality played a strong to very strong role in the group (Layer, Roberts,
Wild, & Walters, 2004).  Research has also shown an association for young male
criminals to have higher levels of shame while also experiencing spiritual
impoverishment (Kipnis, 1999).  Thus, it was hypothesized that higher levels of reported
spirituality will be predictive of lower levels of reported shame.         
Lastly,  spiritual life is hypothesized to predict the third emotional influence
variable of guilt.  Research has found that individuals who identified themselves as
spiritual also report substantial levels of guilt (Albertsen, O’Connor, & Berry, 2006).  The
link between spiritual life and guilt has been touted as a valuable means to produce social
repair through confessions, apologies, and undoing harm to the offended (Bennett, 2005). 
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In fact, from a Judeo-Christian perspective, the concept of sin in spirituality is a direct
reason for experiencing guilt (Delaney & CiClemente, 2005).  Thus, it was hypothesized
that higher amounts of reported spirituality will be predictive of higher levels of reported
guilt.             
Similar to the spiritual life variable, the last developmental influence variable in
the structural model, ascription to moral authority sources, also predicts all three of the
emotional influence variables of empathy, shame, and guilt.  The ascription to moral
authority sources variable includes several sources such as family, friends, the idea of
equality, governmental institutions, and teachers.  Looking first at the predictive link
between ascription to moral authority sources and empathy, there has been no known
research on this specific topic to date.  However, the socialization influences of family
and peers has been shown to be related to empathic responding in adolescence (e.g.,
Eisenberg & Morris, 2004; Krevans & Gibbs, 1996).  These socialization influences can
be viewed as authority sources in development and therefore predictive of empathy.
Furthermore, other researchers have expanded possible connections to empathy by
developing theoretical ideas based off of empirical investigations of empathy.  For
instance, Hoffman (2000), theorized that when there is a clash between caring for others
and considering the abstract ideas of rights, duty, and reciprocity, empathy is evoked. 
This consideration for justice could be framed as the moral authority source of equality,
as well as that of societal welfare and governmental institutions.  Thus, it was
hypothesized that higher ascription to moral authority sources will be predictive of higher
levels of reported empathy.  
Similar to the link between ascription to moral authority sources and empathy,
37
there has been no known research to date investigating the specific links between
ascription to moral authority and the last two emotional influences - shame and guilt. 
However, some researchers have defined successful moral education by teachers as the
ability to elicit shame and guilt (Maxwell & Reichenbach, 2005).  Since teachers are
considered a moral authority source, the predicted links in the current model to shame and
guilt are tentatively supported.  Based on limited knowledge, it is hypothesized that
ascription to moral authority sources will be predictive of higher levels of reported shame
and higher levels of reported guilt.  
Finally, all three moral emotions - empathy, shame, and guilt - are hypothesized to
predict moral judgment competence.  Since moral emotions are involved in practical,
real-world situations, it is hypothesized that these emotional qualities will play a
predictive role in solving cognitive, rational moral dilemmas as well.  Marc D. Hauser’s
body of research with moral transgressions, reviewed in his book Moral Minds: How
nature designed our universal sense of right and wrong, suggests just such a link.  “...at
least some of our moral judgments - perhaps only those handling norms against harm and
disgust - may emerge from our emotions” (Hauser, 2006, pp. 240, emphasis not added). 
Hauser’s research with moral transgressions is similar in design to the Moral Judgment
Test’s (Lind, 2005, 2006, in press; Lind & Wakenhut, 1985) cognitive dilemmas.  Hence,
it was thought that the Moral Judgment Test would be able to replicate Hauser’s findings
because the dilemmas represented transgress the norms of harm (The Worker’s Dilemma)
and of harm and disgust (The Doctor’s Dilemma).  Furthermore, additional research has
shown a positive correlation between specifically empathy and moral behavior as well as
guilt and moral behavior (DeHaan & Hanford, 1997).  Thus, the current model
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hypothesized that higher reported levels of all three moral emotions - empathy, shame,
and guilt - will be predictive of higher levels of moral judgment competence.      
In conclusion, the current structural equation model explores two types of
influences in the prediction of moral judgment competence - developmental and
emotional.  These influences can be mapped onto the lifespan such that the
developmental influences relate to early development and the emotional influences relate
to later development in young adulthood.  Furthermore, the emotional influences directly
predict moral judgment competence which conceptually bridges the theoretical areas of
social learning/social cognition and cognitive structuralism.  Influence of both theoretical
orientations can be seen in the current model’s emphasis on the early portion of the
lifespan.  Unique contributions of the social learning/social cognition orientation can be
seen through the model’s contextual focus in the developmental influence variables and
the emergence of the emotional influence variables.  On the other hand, unique
contributions of the cognitive structuralism orientation can be seen through the
measurement of moral judgment competence.  Moral judgment competence is measured
via the Moral Judgment Test (Lind, 2005, 2006, in press; Lind & Wakenhut, 1985) which
has dimensions of Kohlberg’s six stage model represented and rational, cognitive
dilemmas presented.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
“You only know what you know by how you know it.”  - Author
Participants
Two-hundred eighty-seven college students participated in the current study, some
as volunteers and others in exchange for course credit.  After listwise deletion of missing
data, the sample size was reduced to two-hundred fifty-eight participants.  Listwise
deletion involves the removal of the entire participant from the analysis if any item on
measures are omitted.  Listwise deletion was chosen over other methods of dealing with
missing data because listwise deletion maintains a uniform number of participants across
constructs (as opposed to possibly having different sample sizes for each construct). 
Maintaining a uniform number of participants across constructs is statistically important
when conducting structural equation modeling.  Unequal sample sizes can cause issues
with error estimations, creating the inability to properly test the theoretical model. 
Alterative methods include the imputation of values into the missing cases, such as the
mean, which can result in the misrepresentation of findings in smaller sample sizes (i.e.,
causing it to be more likely to find a false significant result).  The present study has a
smaller sample size, relatively speaking compared to other structural equation model
studies, and would thus be susceptible to this problem.  Hence, the loss of 29 participants
from the current sample was considered acceptable when evaluating the alternatives. 
Although missing data is not considered random, no pattern distinct from the present
40
sample’s demographic composition was noted in the participants who were dropped from
the analysis (i.e., in age, gender, ethnicity, religious affiliation, and year in school) .          
In terms of demographics in the remaining two-hundred fifty-eight participants,
one-hundred sixty-two were female and ninety-six were male (Age M = 20.93; Median =
20; Mode = 19; Range 17 to 38 years).  All participants were classified as being in early
adulthood (approximately 18 to 39 years of age; Santrock, 2006) with a majority just
starting to emerge into early adulthood.  Furthermore, there was a fairly even distribution
with respect to undergraduate year in school (Freshman N = 77; Sophomore N = 44;
Junior N = 66; Senior N = 70; Graduate N = 1).  Unfortunately, there was little diversity
in the sample in terms of ethnicity, with a majority of the sample identifying themselves
as Caucasian (N = 204), with the next largest group being Native Americans (N = 13)
followed by Bi- or Multi-racial individuals (N = 11), Hispanics (N = 7), Others (ethnicity
not represented; N = 7), and Asian-Pacific Islanders (N = 5).  Similarly, a majority of the
sample reported being affiliated with a Christian religious denomination with the two
largest groups being Baptist (N = 62) and Non-denominational (N = 52), with the next
largest group being Catholic (N = 29), Methodist (N = 29), None (N = 26), and Other
(e.g., multi-denominational, Church of Christ, Pentecostal, Lutheran, Buddhist; N = 25)
followed by Agnostic (N = 16), Presbyterian (N = 10), Muslim (N = 4), Jewish (N = 3),
Mormon (N = 1), and Native American (N = 1).   
Measures
Self-Report Family Inventory Version II (SFI; Beavers & Hampson, 1990; see
Appendix A).  The SFI is a 36-item questionnaire that is an index of family dysfunction. 
Participants rate each descriptive statement on a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from “1
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- Yes: Fits our family very well” to “5 - No: Does not fit our family”.  The SFI has five
scales: Health/Competence (range 19-95), Conflict (range 12-60), Cohesion (range 5-25),
Leadership (range 3-15), and Expressiveness (range 5-25), with higher scores indicating
higher dysfunction.  Directions and items of the SFI for the present study have been
retrospectively worded as done by previous researchers (Hadley, Holloway, &
Mallinckrodt, 1993).  The SFI has been reported to have adequate psychometric
properties such as internal consistency for each scale ranging from .84 to .88 (Cronbach’s
alpha) and test-retest reliability correlations over a 1- to 3-month period ranging from .44
to .85.  Additionally, no significant correlations were found between the SFI scales and
social desirability as measured by the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale
(Beavers & Hampson, 1990).  The Cronbach’s alphas in the current sample for each sub-
scale were as follows: Health/Competence (.93), Conflict (.90), Cohesion (.78),
Leadership (.32), and Expressiveness (.86).  With the exception of Leadership, these
reliability estimates mirror those found in the past. 
Spiritual Involvement and Beliefs Scale-Revised (SIBS-R; Hatch, Burg,
Naberhaus, & Hellmich, 1998; see Appendix B).  The SIBS-R is a 22-item self-report
questionnaire measuring spiritual involvement and beliefs via four scales: Core
Spirituality (range 16-112), Spiritual Perspective/Existential (range 5-35), Personal
Application/Humility (range 2-14), and Acceptance/Insight (range 1-7).  The Core
Spirituality scale addresses participants’ spiritual connection, sense of meaning, faith,
ritual involvement and spiritual experiences.  The Spiritual Perspective/Existential scale
addresses participants’ meditation and reflection on the meaning of life.  The Personal
Application/Humility scale addresses participants’ humility and the application of
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spiritual beliefs to everyday living.  The Acceptance/Insight scale addresses participants’
insight into the futility of focusing attention on things which cannot be changed.  On the
SIBS-R, participants rate items on a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from “7 - Strongly
Agree” to “1 - Strongly Disagree”, except for the last item which ask participants’ to rank
how spiritual they consider themselves to be on a 7-point scale with “7" being the most
spiritual.  The SIBS-R has adequate psychometric properties with a .92 reliability
coefficient and a .93 test-retest correlation (R. L. Hatch, personal communication, January
8, 2007).  The Cronbach’s alphas in the current sample for each sub-scale were as
follows: Core Spirituality (.94), Spiritual Perspective/Existential (.64), and Personal
Application/Humility (.24).  A Cronbach’s alpha cannot be calculated for the
Acceptance/Insight sub-scale since it consists of one item.  With the exception of
Personal Application/Humility, these reliability estimates mirror those found in the past.  
Revised Moral Authority Scale (MAS-R; White, 1997; see Appendix C).  The
MAS-R assesses the influence of different moral authorities (e.g., family, teachers) on
moral decisions.  The MAS-R poses six moral questions where participants respond
either “Yes / No / Can’t decide” to each question and write open ended justifications
behind each choice.  Participants then rate on a 10-point Likert-type scale ranging from “0
- No Influence” to “10 - A Powerful Influence” the amount of impact different sources
have had on the current decision.  The seven sources of moral influence or sources of
moral authority are as follows: (a) self-interest, (b) family, (c) teachers, friends, and the
media, (d) society’s welfare, (e) equality, (f) religious/church institutions, and (g)
       As noted earlier, the sources of religious/church and governmental institutions were 3
added for the current study and were not a part of White’s original scale.  It was thought
that these were salient sources of authority for moral development which needed to be
represented.
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governmental institutions .  A total score is calculated for each moral authority source3
with higher scores indicating stronger influence.  Moral authority source scales can range
from 0-70.  The MAS-R has been reported to have Cronbach alpha split-half reliabilities
for each scale ranging from .75 to .93 and test-retest reliability correlations for each scale
ranging from .95 to .98 over a 4-week period.  The MAS-R has also been reported to have
convergent validity with the Defining Issues Test and discriminant validity with the
Visions of Morality Scale (White, 1997).  The Cronbach’s alphas in the current sample
for each sub-scale were as follows: (a) self-interest = .82, (b) family = .90, (c) teachers,
friends, and the media = .89, (d) society’s welfare = .74, (e) equality = .80, (f)
religious/church institutions = .95, and (g) governmental institutions = .88.  These
reliability estimates mirror those found in the past.    
          Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1983, 1996; see Appendix D).  The IRI
is a 28-item questionnaire that takes a multidimensional approach to the measurement of
empathy by assessing participants’ dispositional tendencies in four facet areas:
perspective taking, empathic concern, personal distress, and fantasy.  Perspective taking
involves the tendency to spontaneously adopt another’s point of view.  Empathic concern
involves the tendency to experience feelings of compassion for unfortunate others. 
Personal distress involves the tendency to experience distress and discomfort in response
to others in extreme distress.  Fantasy involves the tendency to imaginatively transpose
oneself into fictional situations (Davis, 1983, 1996).  Participants rate these 4
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dispositional tendencies on a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from “0 - does not
describe me well” to “4 - describes me very well).  Each area or scale ranges from 0 - 28
since each scale contains seven items, with higher scores indicating greater empathy. 
Adequate internal consistency of the IRI scales have been shown ranging from .70 to .78
along with adequate test-retest reliabilities ranging from .61 to .81 over a two-month
period (Davis, 1980, cited in Davis, 1996).  The Cronbach’s alphas in the current sample
for each sub-scale were as follows: perspective taking (.80), empathic concern (.77), 
personal distress (.78), and fantasy (.82).  These reliability estimates mirror those found
in the past.         
Test of Self-Conscious Affect 3 - Short Version (TOSCA 3; Tangney & Dearing,
2002; see Appendix E).  The TOSCA 3 - Short Version is a 44-item questionnaire that
differentiates the emotional dispositions of shame and guilt, allowing participants’ scores
on one scale to be independent of the other.  Furthermore, the scale is based in behavioral
terms rather than abstract language.  Beyond shame and guilt, the TOSCA 3 - Short
Version also measures externalization and detachment which will not be detailed in the
current study.  The TOSCA 3 - Short Version presents 11 different negatively orientated
behavioral scenarios.  Participants must rate the likelihood of how they would act and feel
in the given situation on a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from “1 - not likely” to “5 -
very likely”.  Each option represents a scale (i.e., shame, guilt, externalization, and
detachment).  For example, the scenario may be “While playing around, you throw a ball
and it hits your friend in the face” with possible rating options of “You would feel
inadequate that you could not even throw a ball” and “You would apologize and make
sure your friend feels better”.  The TOSCA - 3 Short Version shame and guilt scales have
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been reported to correlate .94 and .93, respectively with the longer version of the
TOSCA- 3 shame and guilt scales.  Adequate internal consistency reliabilities for the
shame (.77-.88) and guilt (.70-.83) scales of the TOSCA-3 have been reported (Tangney
& Dearing, 2002).  The Cronbach’s alphas in the current sample for each sub-scale were
as follows: shame (.74) and guilt (.71) which mirror reliability estimates found in the
past.             
Moral Judgment Test (MJT;  Lind, 2005, 2006, in press; Lind & Wakenhut, 1985;
see Appendix F). The MJT measures competence in moral judgment development.  The
MJT has some characteristics of Kohlbergian moral development but is theoretically
based on Lind’s dual-aspect model (Lind, 2005, in press; Lind & Wakenhut, 1985). 
Kohlberg’s definition of moral judgment competence was used in the development of the
MJT which states that moral judgment competence is “the capacity to make decisions and
judgments which are moral (i.e., based on internal principles) and to act in accordance
with such judgments” (Kohlberg, 1964, p.425).  On the MJT, participants are presented
with a total of two moral dilemmas and must judge, one at a time, whether they agree or
disagree with a character’s behavior in the dilemma on a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging
from “-3: I strongly disagree” to “+3: I strongly agree”.  Afterwards, twelve different
arguments (six pro and six con) are presented and participants must rate on a 9-point
Likert-type scale ranging from “-4: I strongly reject” to “+4: I strongly accept” how
acceptable they find the presented arguments.  The arguments correspond to Kohlberg’s
six stages of moral development, with two arguments presented per stage (one pro and
one con).  
Scoring of the MJT involves calculating a C-score (or C-index or C) which uses
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similar calculations as to those used in MANOVA (for further details see the section
Measuring Moral Development Empirically: The Moral Judgment Test in Chapter II). 
The C-score ranges from 0 to 100 and indicates the percentage of an individual’s total
response variation in their judgments of the moral quality of the given arguments.  In
other words, the C-score reflects consistency in moral judgments.  The C-score can be
categorized as falling into one of six different ranges: (1-9) very low, (10-19) low, (20-
29) medium, (30-39) high, (40-49) very high and (above 50) extraordinarily high (Lind,
in press).  The mean C-score for each sample collected should be within the range of 10
and 40 (Lind, 2006).  The MJT has numerous cross-cultural validation work with more
than 30 foreign language versions.  Typical reliability statistics (e.g., internal consistency)
for the measure, however, do not exist since variability (or judgment consistency) is the
theoretical construct of interest rather than an attribute of the test (Lind, 2006).  Even so,
the test-retest correlation of the MJT over a one-month period has been reported at .90
(Lerkiatbunkit, Utaipan, Laohawiriyanon, & Teo, 2006).  The mean C-score for the
current sample was 19.01 (median = 15.61; SD = 15.25) with the lowest C-score being
0.09 and the highest C-score being 76.53.                       
Procedure
Participants were tested in small groups (varying between 1 to 30 individuals)
within quiet rooms.  Participants were explained their rights and asked to sign an
informed consent.  Participants then completed a demographics form (see Appendix G)
followed by a randomized presentation of all six questionnaires.   Upon completion of the
questionnaires, participants were debriefed and thanked for their participation. 
Experimental sessions typically took no more than one hour.        
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CHAPTER IV
FINDINGS
“All truths are easy to understand once they are discovered; the point is to discover
them.”  -Galileo Galiliei
Descriptive statistics for indicators in the measurement portion of the model are
presented in Table 2.  As can be seen, the sub-scales with the highest means for each
latent variable were Cohesion (M = 2.61; SD = .74; Dysfunctional Family Life), Spiritual
Perspective/Existential (M = 5.59; SD = .81; Spiritual Life), Equality (M = 8.80; SD =
1.46; Ascription to Moral Authority Sources), and Empathic Concern (M = 2.98; SD =
.59; Empathy).  The constructs of Shame and Guilt were based on individual items rather
than average sub-scale calculations.  In other words, the Shame and Guilt indicators were
comprised of individual questionnaire items while the indicators of Dysfunctional Family
Life, Spiritual Life, Ascription to Moral Authority Source, and Empathy were comprised
of questionnaire sub-scales (i.e., the average of a select number of questionnaire items). 
The item with the highest mean for the shame scale was item 1 (M = 3.98; SD = 1.11):
“You make plans to meet a friend for lunch.  At 5 o’clock, you realize you stood your
friend up.  You would think: I’m inconsiderate”.  The highest mean for the guilt scale was
from item 5 (M = 4.80; SD = .51): “While playing around, you throw a ball and it hits
your friend in the face.  You would apologize and make sure your friend feels better”. 
The average C-score was 19.01 (SD = 15.25) with an observed range of 0.09 to 76.53.  
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Moving beyond basic descriptive statistics, the present study proposed a
theoretical network of relationships between a variety of developmental, emotional, and
cognitive variables (see Figure 3).  Due to the nature of this theoretical flow system, the
most appropriate method of analyses is Structural Equation Modeling (SEM).  SEM is a
hybrid of statistical techniques involving Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA), Path
Analysis (PA), and Multiple Regression (MR).  SEM involves the simultaneous
estimating of two models - a measurement model and a structural model.  The
measurement portions of the model relate observed scores (i.e., item scores and sub-scale
scores) to the latent variables using CFA. The structural portions of the model relate the
latent variables to one another using PA. Finally, SEM is like multiple regression in its
ability to test numerous predicted relationships resulting in a fully multivariate approach
to model testing. Another unique benefit of SEM is its ability to account for measurement
error in the various estimates of the model.  Further benefits of SEM are described by
Rigdon (1998).   
One disadvantage of SEM is the requirement of large sample sizes.  Generally,
five cases per estimated parameter are recommend for power purposes (Rigdon, 1998). 
There were ninety-nine estimated parameters in the current model which, according to
Rigdon, would require four-hundred ninety-five participants.  The chi-square goodness-
of-fit statistic that is routinely used to test the significance of SEM models, however, is
notoriously sensitive to sample size. Specifically, with large samples the test will almost
always be statistically significant, which would indicate poor model fit for the observed
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data. Perhaps ironically, a statistically significant chi-square also indicates sufficient
statistical power to detect population effects in the data. The relationship between power
and sample size in SEM is obviously complex, as reviewed by Diamantopoulos and
Siguaw (2006, pp.94). The sample size for the present analysis was 258 participants and
the chi-square goodness-of-fit statistic for the SEM model was statistically significant (p
< .001). Consequently, although the recommended sample size (n = 495) was not
obtained, the sample was considered sufficient for detecting meaningful effects in the
structural parameters in the model.         
Another disadvantage of SEM is that a researcher’s data can never confirm a
theoretical model.  As mentioned previously, SEM tests the fit of the collected data’s
covariance matrix to that of the matrix implied by the theoretical model.  While fit
indices can indicate magnitude of fit and significance levels (both having research value),
strict confirmation of a particular model in SEM can never result.  This disadvantage,
however, is also seen in other behavioral science statistics.   For further disadvantages of
SEM, see Rigdon (1998).  
SEM statistical analyses were initially conducted using LISREL software. Three
unique methods for covariance matrix analysis using LISREL were attempted: PRELIS
syntax generation of a SPSS FORTRAN data file, PRELIS syntax generation of a SPSS
free-format text output file, and direct input of the covariance matrix into LISREL syntax. 
Each method resulted in the software reading some data entry points correctly and others
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incorrectly.  After numerous failed attempts to generate and analyze the proper covariance
matrix, a more parsimonious set of analyses was chosen to test the model.
The new set of analyses involved a three-step process.  First, an image factor
analysis was conducted for each latent variable or portion of the SEM measurement
model (dysfunctional family life, spiritual life, ascription to moral authority, empathy,
shame, and guilt). An image analysis was not conducted for moral judgment competence
since it had only one indicator.  The observed scale or sub-scale scores were factored, and
only one image factor was extracted. Determinate factor scores (see Grice, 2001) were
then computed for each latent variable. These factor scores represented each participant’s
relative standing on each of the latent variables.  Second, regression analyses were
conducted on the factor scores to test the individual structural parameters in the model. In
other words, path analyses were conducted on the latent variable scores to estimate the
structural parameters. Third, the 7 X 7 covariance matrix of the 6 factor scores and the C-
score were entered into LISREL to generate statistics of overall model fit. 
Table 3 presents the summary of the image factor analyses with the percentage of
variance explained by each extracted factor as well as the loadings for each indicator.  By
constraining each analysis to one factor, as hypothesized by a single latent variable, the
largest variance explained by the extracted factors was observed for Dysfunctional Family
Life, 62.03%.  This is a relatively large amount of explained variance in the construct
Dysfunctional Family Life.  The next highest value was observed for Ascription to Moral
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Authority Sources at 26.85%.  Overall, the magnitudes of the loadings were relatively
large (most above .30) which supports the one-factor model for each latent variable. 
The correlations between the six factor scores from the image analyses and the C-
score in the measurement model are presented in Table 4.  As can been seen, many of
these bi-variate correlations were statistically significant and consistent with the
predictions shown in the model (see Figure 4). Specifically, Dysfunctional Family Life
was negatively related to Spiritual Life and Ascription to Moral Authority Sources; and
Spiritual Life and Ascription to Moral Authority Sources were positively correlated.
To explore possible gender differences on the seven constructs, independent
samples t-tests were conducted on the six factors scores and the C-score.  Factor scores
are similar to z-scores in that they typically range from -2 to +2 and have a mean of zero. 
Four of the seven t-tests indicated significant gender differences (all p’s <  .01). 
Specifically, females reported significantly higher levels of all three moral emotions
  Females  Males Females (Empathy 0  = .07, SD = .50 vs. 0  = -.12, SD = .54; Guilt 0 = .16, SD =
   Males Females Males.65 vs. 0  = -.27, SD = .82; Shame 0 = .16, SD = .81 vs. 0  = -.27, SD = .64). 
Furthermore, females reported significantly higher Ascription to Moral Authority Sources
  Females Malesthan males (0 = .10, SD = .73 vs. 0  = -.17, SD = .92).  It is important to note
that the current study had 63% females and only 37% males (N = 162 and N = 96,
respectively).                       
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The path analysis (i.e., multiple regression) results for the structural parameters of
the model, which represent the central predictions of this study, are presented in Table 5
and Figure 4. Results indicated that three of the four regression models were highly
significant.  The regression model predicting Moral Judgment Competence was non-
significant.  Spiritual Life ($ = .34, p = < .001) and Ascription to Moral Authority
Sources ($ = .22, p = < .001) were strong predictors of Empathy, while the estimated
parameter for Dysfunctional Family Life was not statistically significant ($ = .06, p =
.29).  For Shame, all three building blocks of moral development (Dysfunctional Family
Life, Spiritual Life, Ascription to Moral Authority Sources) were strong predictors (see
Table 5 and Figure 4) with standardized regression weights in excess of .18 in absolute
value (all p’s < .01).  Similarly, Spiritual Life and Ascription to Moral Authority Sources
were also strong predictors of Guilt ($ = .26, p = < .001; $ = .24, p = < .001, respectively;
see Table 5 and Figure 4).     
Despite these many positive findings regarding the specific structural parameters,
the current model, overall, did not fit the data well as revealed by a significant minimum
fit function chi-square, X  (N = 258, 7) = 88.98, p < .001. As noted above, a non-2
significant chi-square would indicate high agreement between the model and the observed
data. The comparative fit index, or CFI, was .65 which indicated some positive structure
to the model but still fell well below the recommended values of .90 or .95.  A CFI of 1.0
would indicate perfect fit. Lastly, the root mean square error of approximation, or
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RMSEA, also indicated poor fit. The observed RMSEA was .23, and values below .05 (0
indicating perfect fit), are considered to indicate adequate model fit. 
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
“After climbing a great hill, one only finds that there are many more hills to climb.”  
- Nelson Mandela
The purpose of the present study was to better understand the foundation and
development of human morality.  In the opening story, how did Karol know stealing the
baseball cards was wrong and why did he return the cards to the store?  Karol experienced
a spiritual connection with God, seeing this as a personal relationship and a source of
moral authority.  It is possible Karol’s family environment was also a source of moral
foundation for how he experienced his baseball card heist.  Furthermore, Karol
experienced the emotions of guilt and shame in association with his actions.  Although
not directly depicted, Karol may have felt empathy for the store owner since stealing the
baseball cards might cause her or him unjust suffering.  Karol’s story of morality involves
a complex interaction of past experiences, emotions, present thoughts, and behaviors. 
Attaining understanding of this complex interaction will only be reached from a multi-
construct research perspective of morality.  While philosophers have debated about the
state of the human moral condition for centuries, the present study sought to empirically
gain knowledge about human morality utilizing the multi-construct statistical approach of
structural equation modeling.  
Although Karol’s story is set in late childhood, the current structural equation
model was theoretically hypothesized to map onto the lifespan with foundational
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constructs occurring in early life and predicted constructs occurring in young adulthood. 
In other words, the foundational constructs or building blocks of moral development
(family functioning, spiritual life, and ascription to moral authority sources) were
hypothesized to occur in early development and then were hypothesized to predict the
moral emotions (empathy, shame, and guilt) in young adulthood.  It was not thought that
there was an absence of these emotions prior to young adulthood; rather, it was
hypothesized that the building blocks of moral development would foster the moral
emotions into young adulthood.  Furthermore, it was hypothesized that these moral
emotions would predict moral judgment competence or moral cognitive reasoning ability
into young adulthood.    
In order to truly test this sequential lifespan model, a developmental research
design (e.g., longitudinal, cross-sectional, etc.) would need to be implemented with data
collection points at the early portion of the lifespan as well as in adulthood.  In the
absence of such a design, a direct test of this theory is not possible.  This is the case in the
current study because only young adulthood was sampled.  However, the casual
implications implied in structural equation modeling allow insight into possible
developmental trends.  In other words, the statistical ability to predict one variable from
another is a possible time series or cause-and-effect relationship.  Hence, the statistical
analyses used in the present study offers insight into these theorized lifespan variables. 
Future research efforts will involve the selection of current variables which have
promising relationships but explore these variables in the context of a developmental
design.  
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Turning to the results of the present study, the current structural equation model
was found to be an overall poor fit for the observed data; however, there were some
promising relationships among the variables.  The results can be broken down into the
measurement model and structural model.  The measurement model fit well in terms of
loadings and the structural model showed promising relationships among constructs. 
Specifically for the measurement model, a majority of the loadings where salient (.30 or
above) which indicated a good fit (see Table 3).  The few indicators which did not load
well were the acceptance/insight (b = .16) and personal distress (b = .05) sub-scales for
the Spiritual Life and Empathy constructs, respectively as well as items 4 (b = .01) and 3
(b = .23) of the Shame and Guilt constructs, respectively.  For the structural model,
fourteen different directional hypotheses were made which corresponded to the parameter
estimate symbols “+” and “-” in Figure 3.  Ten out of the fourteen directional hypotheses
were supported, showing promise between these constructs.  The four hypotheses not
supported were Dysfunctional Family Life predicting Empathy and the three moral
emotions (Empathy, Shame, and Guilt) predicting Moral Judgment Competence.  
It is unclear why Dysfunctional Family Life was unpredictive of Empathy. 
Perhaps empathy is something that cannot be negatively impacted by a maladaptive home
environment.  No significant correlation between Dysfunctional Family Life and Empathy
was noted as well (r = -.05, p = .38; see Table 4).  In other words, empathy may be
fostered into young adulthood independently of familial functioning (i.e., possibly
fostered on the playground or school setting).  Further research is needed to explore this
interesting finding.  
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The directional hypotheses between the three moral emotions and Moral
Judgment Competence were also not significant.  There are at least three possible
explanations for non-significance.  First, these hypotheses attempted to bridge the two
theoretical areas of social learning/social cognition and cognitive structuralism.  The non-
significant parameters may represent the difficulty of bridging two distinct research areas. 
It is possible that these two theoretical approaches are diametrically opposed, emotion vs.
cognition, and never the twain shall meet.  Social learning/social cognition primarily
focuses on contextual factors and emotionality while cognitive structuralism primarily
focuses on mental phenomena and internal cognitive processing. Moreover, in research
practice, the cognitive structuralism orientation is more focused on artificial vignettes
while the social learning/social cognition orientation is more focused on real-life
situations.  It is probable that these research assessment practices are so different that
comparison in a multi-construct fashion, such as structural equation modeling, is
untenable.  The artificial nature of vignettes and their lack of relation to real-life
situations is likely one reason for the shift in the moral development field from the
cognitive structuralism orientation to the social learning/social cognition orientation.  It
would seem that future multi-construct research efforts may best be served by exploring
morality under a social learning/social cognition framework.             
Second, the moral emotions may not have significantly predicted Moral Judgment
Competence due to the measure of Moral Judgement Competence.  The Moral Judgment
Test (MJT; Lind, 2005, 2006, in press; Lind & Wakenhut, 1985) was used to measure
Moral Judgement Competence.  The Moral Judgment Test conceptually measures
variance.  As a result, the observed standard errors were fairly large which, in turn, makes
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finding significant parameter estimates hard (Empathy $ = -0.02, se = 2.07; Shame $ =
0.05, se = 1.31; Guilt $ = 0.07, se = 1.47; see Table 5).  Even though the Moral Judgment
Test produced fairly large standard errors, a large effect size would be able to counter act
this property of the test.  However, none were noted.  In fact, the effect sizes were
extremely small (all standardized betas < .07 in absolute magnitude; see Table 5 and
Figure 4).  
Another potential problem with the Moral Judgment Test, in relation to the
current model, is that no known predictive or correlational relationships have been
explored between contextual / emotional constructs and scores on the Moral Judgment
Test.  Due to the lack of known relationships with real-life variables, the Moral Judgment
Test does not appear to be the proper outcome variable for the current structural equation
model.  However, the three alternative instruments available for measuring Moral
Judgment Competence are also problematic due to their theoretical foundations in
cognitive structuralism (see Lind, 2004 for a review).  A better outcome variable for the
current structural equation model might be a variable aligned with the social
learning/social cognition orientation.  Specifically, a measure of aggression or antisocial
behavior, with the inclusion of a cognitive reasoning ability aspect, might be better suited
for the current model.  By altering the outcome variable to a measure of aggression or
antisocial behavior, the possible integration between the theoretical orientations of
cognitive structuralism and social learning/social cognition would be lost.  However, the
building of a bridge between these two theoretical orientations may not be needed.  By
retaining a cognitive aspect within the outcome variable, the complexity of human
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behavior is retained and the possibility for great advances can be seen.  Future research
efforts will be towards this aim.             
Third, the moral emotions were unpredictive of Moral Judgment Competence
possibly because the moral emotions were the wrong constructs for the prediction or there
may need to be intervening variables represented between the moral emotions and Moral
Judgment Competence.  In other words, the proposed structure of variables in the current
model may be theoretically incorrect.  One could argue that the developmental building
blocks should directly predict Moral Judgment Competence rather than going through the
moral emotions.  However, the results of the present study indicated that the
developmental building blocks had no significant correlations with Moral Judgment
Competence (Dysfunctional Family Life r = .04, p = .51; Spiritual Life r = .03, p = .63;
Ascription to Moral Authority Sources r = < .01, p = .97; see Table 4).  The present study
cannot account for possible missing variable(s) between the moral emotions and Moral
Judgment Competence.  However, given the preceding argument for the preference of the
social learning/social cognition orientation and the promising relationships seen among
the rest of the variables, the current model may be best modified by changing the outcome
variable.      
Three limitations in the present study can be noted.  First, there was an uneven
distribution between female and male participants.  Approximately three-fifths the present
study’s participants were female (N = 162 female and N = 96 male).  This uneven
distribution is not unusual given the psychology courses and activities sampled. 
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Significant gender differences were found on four of the seven constructs such that
females reported higher levels of all three moral emotions (Empathy, Shame, and Guilt)
and higher Ascription to Moral Authority Sources.  Hence, the present results need to be
interpreted with this limitation.  Future research efforts will aim for an even distribution
of females and males and also explore gender specific moral development models.             
  Second, the current model theorized lifespan influences and utilized statistical
modeling techniques to imply their development.  However, only a developmental
research design (e.g., longitudinal, cross-sectional, etc.) would provide a true test of
sequential lifespan change.  Similarly, the current model was referred to as a model of
moral development based on the incorporation of a self-report moral development
measure.  This was to ensure consistency with the current literature base.  However, it is
important to note that measurement is no substitute for research design.  Future efforts
will therefore incorporate both longitudinal and cross-sectional designs as true indicators
of moral development.  
Third, the present study employed only self-report questionnaires within the
design.  Self-report instruments have well-known limitations compared to other methods
of data collection such as video coding, interview, and physiological recordings.  Some
possible limitations include participants feigning different psychological states
(knowingly or unknowingly), misreading or misinterpreting questionnaire items and
directions, and omitting or confusing item numbers.  In the present study, self-report
questionnaires were utilized to provided a secure and private environment, helping
participants feel more comfortable about revealing sensitive information on topics like
euthanasia.  Furthermore, questionnaires allowed for smaller set-up costs and fewer
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restrictions on the testing environment as compared to other forms of data collection such
as video coding and physiological recordings.  Thus, the current study’s use of self-report
questionnaires has both positive and negative aspects.  Future research will incorporate a
multimethod approach to the study of developmental morality (see Morris, Robinson, &
Eisenberg, 2006).               
There are two noteworthy strengths of the present study.  First, the statistical
technique of structural equation modeling has the ability to account for complex
relationships such as those involved in moral development.  Infrequent use of this
statistical technique may be partially due to the inability of some computer programs to
properly analyze complex models.  However, the present study presents a three-step
process which simplifies the covariance matrix, creating a more parsimonious set of
analyses (see Chapter IV).  This new set of structural equation modeling procedures could
be used in future research, allowing more researchers to explore morality from a multi-
construct perspective.  The present study represents a pioneering effort to shape the field
of moral development towards the use of a multi-construct perspective.  
Second, the current model represents the first known attempt to combine moral
developmental building blocks, moral emotions, and moral judgment competence. 
Furthermore, the current model also represents a novel theory of lifespan development
mapped onto a structural equation model.  Future research will build on the significant
relationships from the current model.             
In conclusion, it is hoped that the current model will advance the field of moral
development by (1) contributing a novel theory of lifespan development, (2) providing a
structural equation framework of developmental and emotional variables for future multi-
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construct research, (3) presenting knowledge about presently unexplored relationships
such as ascription to moral authority sources and moral emotions, and (4) stimulating
further theories which interrelate the lifespan and structural equation modeling
techniques.    
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Table 1 
Seven Key Constructs, Definitions of Constructs, Measures, and Indicators
________________________________________________________________________
DEVELOPMENTAL INFLUENCES
I.  Dysfunctional Family Life
< Dysfunction family life is defined as regular stereotyped relational patterns and
consistent emerging themes across family life which are negative and unhealthy.  
A.  Self-Report Family Inventory Version II (see Appendix A). 
• The measure has 5 scales: Health/Competence (poor problem solving,
sadness, negativity), Conflict (fighting, arguing, overt unresolved conflict),
Cohesion (disconnection, lack of togetherness, lack of satisfaction),
Leadership (lack of strong, consistent adult leadership), and Expressiveness
(little or no feelings of closeness, little or no physical and verbal expression of
positive feelings, unease in expression of warmth and caring).   
II.  Spiritual Life
< Spiritual life is defined as an individual’s personal relationship with a higher
power and behaviors and thoughts associated with that relationship.  Spiritual life
is not rooted in any particular religion nor tied to any organized institution.  
B.  Spiritual Involvement and Beliefs Scale-Revised (see Appendix B).  
• The measure has 4 scales: Core Spirituality (belief in a higher power, nature
connection, ritual involvement, spiritual experiences, a sense of meaning,
ability to have faith, involvement in a spiritual community), Spiritual
Perspective/Existential (mediation, spiritual perspective, reflecting on the
meaning of life), Personal Application/Humility (application of humility and
applying spirituality in day-to-day living), and Acceptance/Insight (the ability
to accept things which cannot be changed).       
III.  Ascription to Moral Authority Sources 
< Ascription to moral authority sources is defined as the individual attributed level
of influence to different sources of moral authority in moral decision making.  In
other words, ascription to moral authority sources is what persons and/or groups
are having an impact on the individual’s moral decision making.
C.  Revised Moral Authority Scale (see Appendix C).
• The measure has 7 scales: (a) Self-Interest, (b) Family, (c) Teachers, Friends,
and the Media, (d) Society’s Welfare, (e) Equality, (f) Religious/Church
Institutions, and (g) Governmental Institutions. 
EMOTIONAL INFLUENCES
IV.  Empathy
< Empathy is defined as a multidimensional emotion (i.e., dispositional tendencies)
involving understanding other’s point of views, experiencing compassion and
distress for others, and having the ability to transpose into fictitious situations.  
D.  Interpersonal Reactivity Index
• The measure has 4 scales: Perspective Taking (tendency to spontaneously
adopt another’s point of view), Empathic Concern (tendency to experience
feelings of compassion for unfortunate others), Personal Distress (tendency to
experience distress and discomfort in response to others in extreme distress),
and Fantasizing (tendency to imaginatively transpose oneself into fictional
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Table 1 (cont.)
situations).  A multidimensional approach to the measurement of the emotion
empathy by assessing dispositional tendencies in 4 facet areas: Perspective
Taking, Empathic Concern, Personal Distress, and Fantasy (see Appendix D).  
V.  Shame
< Shame is defined as a painful, negative global evaluation of the self with
associated feelings of worthlessness and powerlessness.  Shame motivates
concealment, escape, or striking back. Shame is typically more devastating and
painful than guilt.  
E.  Test of Self-Conscious Affect 3-Short Version (see Appendix E).    
• A questionnaire that differentiates the emotional dispositions of shame and
guilt with shame being more focused on negative self-evaluations.  The shame
scale has eleven items.     
VI.  Guilt
< Guilt is defined as generally less painful than shame because guilt is associated
with a specific behavior rather than the self-concept.  Feelings of guilt, however,
can be painful and accompanied with nagging preoccupations with the specific
transgression causing wishes about how the transgression hadn’t occurred.
Associated feelings with guilt are tension, remorse, and regret.  Guilt motivates
confession, apologies, and attempts to undo the harm done. 
F.  Test of Self-Conscious Affect 3-Short Version (see Appendix E).
• A questionnaire that differentiates the emotional dispositions of shame and
guilt with guilt being more focused on the negative action rather than on the
self.  The guilt scale has eleven items.     
OUTCOME
VII.  Moral Judgment Competence
< Moral Judgment Competence is defined as the cognitive reasoning ability to be
consistent in the application of moral principles across situations.
G.  Moral Judgment Test (see Appendix F).
• An instrument that measures moral judgment competence which is making
decisions in accordance with internal principles.  The Moral Judgment Test
has some characteristics of Kohlbergian stage moral development but is
theoretically based on Lind’s dual-aspect model.  Scoring involves analyzing
inter-item variance within participant and deriving a C-score from MANOVA
formulas
________________________________________________________________________
Note. Constructs appear after Roman numerals, definitions of constructs appear after the
“<” symbols, measures appear after capital letters, and indicators appear after the “C”
symbols.   
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics for Indicators in Measurement Model
______________________________________________________________________________________________________
             M          SD Median Possible Range Observed Min Observed Max
Indicators
______________________________________________________________________________________________________
Dysfunctional Family Life
      Health/Competence 2.18 .71 2.05 1-5 1.11 4.95
      Conflict 2.00 .77 1.83 1-5 1.00 4.75
      Cohesion 2.61 .74 2.60 1-5 1.20 5.00
Leadership 2.12 .73 2.00 1-5 1.00 5.00
      Expressiveness 2.00 .88 1.80 1-5 1.00 4.80
   Spiritual Life
      Core Spirituality 5.02 1.30 5.31 1-7 1.63 6.88
      Spiritual Perspective/
   Existential 5.59 .81 5.60 1-7 3.00 7.00
      Personal Application/
   Humility 5.30 1.03 5.50 1-7 2.50 7.00
Acceptance/Insight 4.66 1.45 5.00 1-7 1.00 7.00
 Ascription to Moral Authority Sources    
      Self-Interest 6.52 1.88 6.71 0-10 0.00 10.00
      Family 6.07 2.17 6.21 0-10 0.00 10.00
      Teachers, Friends,
   and the Media 5.05 1.87 5.29 0-10 0.00 9.14
Society’s Welfare 7.26 1.46 7.43 0-10 2.14 10.00
      Equality 8.08 1.46 8.14 0-10 1.00 10.00
      Religious/Church 5.35 3.01 5.86 0-10 0.00 10.00
Government 5.08 2.04 5.14 0-10 0.00 10.00
Empathy
      Perspective Taking 2.61 .67 2.57 0-4 0.43 4.00
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Empathic Concern 2.98 .59 3.00 0-4 0.71 4.00
      Personal Distress 1.59 .70 1.57 0-4 0.00 3.29
Fantasy 2.52 .81 2.57 0-4 0.43 4.00
Shame    
      Item 1 3.98 1.11 4.00 1-5 1.00 5.00
      Item 2 1.41 .71 1.00 1-5 1.00 5.00
      Item 3 3.55 1.21 4.00 1-5 1.00 5.00
Item 4 1.83 .96 2.00 1-5 1.00 5.00
      Item 5 1.94 1.15 2.00 1-5 1.00 5.00
      Item 6 2.74 1.39 3.00 1-5 1.00 5.00
Item 7 3.16 1.30 3.00 1-5 1.00 5.00
Item 8 2.60 1.23 2.00 1-5 1.00 5.00
      Item 9 3.42 1.22 4.00 1-5 1.00 5.00
      Item 10 3.36 1.19 4.00 1-5 1.00 5.00
Item 11 2.99 1.39 3.00 1-5 1.00 5.00
Guilt    
      Item 1 4.64 .61 5.00 1-5 2.00 5.00
      Item 2 3.90 1.23 4.00 1-5 1.00 5.00
Item 3 3.21 1.19 3.00 1-5 1.00 5.00
Item 4 4.31 .85 4.50 1-5 1.00 5.00
      Item 5 4.80 .51 5.00 1-5 1.00 5.00
      Item 6 3.69 1.30 4.00 1-5 1.00 5.00
Item 7 4.51 .71 5.00 1-5 1.00 5.00
Item 8 3.74 1.14 4.00 1-5 1.00 5.00
      Item 9 4.19 .87 4.00 1-5 1.00 5.00
Item 10 4.21 .89 4.00 1-5 1.00 5.00
Item 11 4.44 .85 5.00 1-5 1.00 5.00
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Table 2 (cont.)
Moral Judgment Competence    
      C-score 19.01 15.25 15.62 0-100 0.09 76.53
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Note. Dysfunctional Family Life, Spiritual Life, Ascription to Moral Authority Sources, and Empathy are all based on average
sub-scale calculations while Shame and Guilt are based on the individual items.  Moral Judgment Competence is based on a C-
score calculation.      
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Table 3
Summary of Image Factor Analysis with Percentage of Variance Explained By Each
Extracted Factor and Loadings for Each Indicator
________________________________________________________________________
Constructs Loadings % of Variance Explained
________________________________________________________________________
Dysfunctional Family Life 62.03
Health/Competence .95
Conflict .87
Cohesion .81
Leadership .37
Expressiveness .81
Spiritual Life 9.63
Core Spirituality .29
Spiritual Perspective/Existential .43
Personal Application/Humility .31
Acceptance/Insight .16
Ascription to Moral Authority Sources 26.85
Self-Interest .43
Family .55
Teachers, Friends, and the Media .53
Society’s Welfare .60
Equality .61
Religious/Church Institutions .37
Government Institutions .50
Empathy 11.40
Perspective Taking .40
Empathic Concern .41
Personal Distress .05
Fantasy .35
Shame 17.95
Item 1 .37
Item 2 .30
Item 3 .46
Item 4 .01
Item 5 .37
Item 6 .44
Item 7 .54
Item 8 .31
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Table 3 (cont.)
Item 9 .58
Item 10 .55
Item 11 .44
Guilt 15.66
Item 1 .44
Item 2 .31
Item 3 .23
Item 4 .43
Item 5 .39
Item 6 .42
Item 7 .31
Item 8 .41
Item 9 .44
Item 10 .42
Item 11 .49
________________________________________________________________________
Note. One factor was extracted in each image factor analysis as theoretically hypothesized
for each construct.   
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Table 4
Intercorrelations Between the Six Factor Scores and the C-score in the Measurement Model
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
                      
Constructs 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________   
 1.  Dysfunctional Family Life .____
 2.  Spiritual Life   -.18 ____
**
3.  Ascription to Moral Authority Sources -.26 .16*** ____
4.  Empathy -.05 .36 .25** ** ____
5.  Shame .15 -.17 .17 .28* ** ** ** ____
6.  Guilt -.10 .30 .28 .46 .33** ** ** ** ____
7.  Moral Judgment Competence .04 .03 <.01 .03 .07 .08 ____
______________________________________________________________________________________________________
Note. p < .05,  p < .01, two-tailed.    * **
80
Table 5
Summary of Regression Analyses for Structural Model from the Six Factor Scores and the 
C-score
________________________________________________________________________
Constructs F    p   R   B          SE B       $2
________________________________________________________________________
Empathy 17.86 <.001 .17**
Dysfunctional Family Life .04 .03 .06
Spiritual Life .36 .06 .34**
Ascription to Moral Authority Sources .14 .04 .22**
Shame 9.40 <.001 .10**
Dysfunctional Family Life .14 .05 .18*
Spiritual Life -.28 .10 -.18*
Ascription to Moral Authority Sources .24 .06 .25**
Guilt 22.25 <.001 .15**
Spiritual Life .40 .09 .26**
Ascription to Moral Authority Sources .22 .05 .24**
Moral Judgment Competence .76 .52 .01
Empathy -.48 2.07 -.02
Shame .95 1.31 .05
Guilt 1.50 1.47 .07
________________________________________________________________________
Note. All F-tests based on 3 and 254 degrees of freedom except for the model predicting
guilt which is based on 2 and 255 degrees of freedom.
p < .01; p < .001*  **
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Figure 1
Patterns of MJT Data from Two Fictitious Participants Rating One Dilemma
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Figure 2
Individual Item Response Pattern Comparison in MJT C-score Calculations
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Figure 3
Theoretically Integrative Lifespan Model of Developmental and Emotional Influences Predicting Moral Judgment Competence
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Figure 4
Path Analysis of Model Fit
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APPENDIX A
   SELF-REPORT FAMILY INVENTORY VERSION II
For each question, mark the answer that best fits how you saw your family while you
were growing-up.  If you feel that your answer is between two of the labeled numbers (the
odd numbers), then choose the even number that is between them.  
Yes: No:
Fits Some: Does
our Fits not
family our fit
very family our
well some family
1.  Family members paid attention to each 
     other’s feelings.   1   2   3   4   5
2.  Our family would of rather do things together
      than with other people.    1   2   3   4   5
3.  We all would have a say in family plans.   1   2   3   4   5
4.  The grownups in the family understood 
      and agreed on family decisions.   1   2   3   4   5
5.  Grownups in the family competed and fought
      with each other.   1   2   3   4   5
6.  There was closeness in my family but each
      person was allowed to be special and different.   1   2   3   4   5
7.  We accepted each other’s friends.   1   2   3   4   5
8.  There was confusion in our family because 
there was no leader.   1   2   3   4   5
9.  Our family members touched and hugged each
     other.   1   2   3   4   5
10.  Family members put each other down.    1   2   3   4   5
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Yes: No:
Fits Some: Does
our Fits not
family our fit
very family our
well some family
11.  We spoke our minds, no matter what.    1   2   3   4   5
12.  In our home, we felt loved.    1   2   3   4   5
13.  Even when we felt close, our family was 
       embarrassed to admit it.   1   2   3   4   5
14.  We argued a lot and never solved problems.   1   2   3   4   5
15.  Our happiest times were at home.    1   2   3   4   5
16.  The grownups in the family were strong 
        leaders.   1   2   3   4   5
17.  The future looked good to our family.    1   2   3   4   5
18.  We usually blamed one person in our family
        when things weren’t going right.   1   2   3   4   5  
19.  Family members went their own way most of 
the time.   1   2   3   4   5
20.  Our family was proud of being close.    1   2   3   4   5
21.  Our family was good at solving problems 
       together.     1   2   3   4   5
22.  Family members easily expressed warmth and
       caring towards each other.   1   2   3   4   5
23.  It’s was okay to fight and yell in our family.   1   2   3   4   5
24.  One of the adults in the family had a favorite
       child.     1   2   3   4   5
25.  When things went wrong we blamed each 
       other.     1   2   3   4   5
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Yes: No:
Fits Some: Does
our Fits not
family our fit
very family our
well some family
26.  We said what we thought and felt.    1   2   3   4   5
27.  Our family members would of rather do things
       with other people than together.   1   2   3   4   5
28.  Family members paid attention to each other
       and listened to what was said.   1   2   3   4   5
29.  We worried about hurting each other’s feelings.  1   2   3   4   5
30.  The mood in my family was usually sad and
       blue.     1   2   3   4   5
31.  We argued a lot.   1   2   3   4   5
32.  One person controlled and lead our family.    1   2   3   4   5
33.  My family was happy most of the time.   1   2   3   4   5
34.  Each person took responsibility for his/her
       behavior.    1   2   3   4   5
________________________________________________________________________
35.  On a scale of 1 to 5, I would rate my family as:
1 2 3 4 5
My family           My family did not function 
functioned very           well together at all.  We really
well together.           needed help.  
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36.  On a scale of 1 to 5, I would rate the independence in my family as:
1 2 3 4 5
(No one was indepen- (Sometimes indepen- (Family members
dent.  There were no dent.  There were some usually went their own
open arguments.  disagreements.  Family way.  Disagreements were
Family members members found satisfac- open.  Family members
relied on each other tion both within and looked outside of the family
for satisfaction outside of the family.) for satisfaction.)
rather than on 
outsiders).  
________________________________________________________________________
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APPENDIX B
Spiritual Involvement and Beliefs Scale - Revised
How strongly do you agree with the following statements?
   Strongly     Agree      Mildly         Neutral       Mildly      Disagree     Strongly 
     Agree                        Agree                              Disagree                       Disagree
1.  I set aside time for meditation
and/or self-reflection.
7           6   5 4 3 2 1
2.  I can find meaning in times of
hardship.
7           6   5 4 3 2 1
3.  A person can be fulfilled without
pursuing an active spiritual life.
7           6   5 4 3 2 1
4.  I find serenity by accepting things as
they are.
7           6   5 4 3 2 1
5.  I have a relationship with someone I
can turn to for spiritual guidance.
7           6   5 4 3 2 1
6.  Prayers do not really change what
happens
7           6   5 4 3 2 1
7.  In times of despair, I can find little
reason to hope.
7           6   5 4 3 2 1
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   Strongly     Agree      Mildly         Neutral       Mildly      Disagree     Strongly 
     Agree                        Agree                              Disagree                       Disagree
8.  I have a personal relationship with a
power greater than myself.
7           6   5 4 3 2 1
9.  I have had a spiritual experience that
greatly changed my life.
7           6   5 4 3 2 1
10.  When I help others, I expect
nothing in return.
7           6   5 4 3 2 1
11.  I don’t take time to appreciate
nature.
7           6   5 4 3 2 1
12.  I have joy in my life because of my
spirituality.
7           6   5 4 3 2 1
13.  My relationship with a higher
power helps me love others mor
completely.
7           6   5 4 3 2 1
14.  Spiritual writings enrich my life. 7           6   5 4 3 2 1
15.  I have experienced healing after
prayer.
7           6   5 4 3 2 1
16.  My spiritual understanding
continues to grow.
7           6   5 4 3 2 1
17. I focus on what needs to be changed
in me, not on what needs to be changed
in others.
7           6   5 4 3 2 1
18. In difficult times, I am still grateful. 7           6   5 4 3 2 1
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   Strongly     Agree      Mildly         Neutral       Mildly      Disagree     Strongly 
     Agree                        Agree                              Disagree                       Disagree
19. I have been through a time of
suffering that led to spiritual growth.
7           6   5 4 3 2 1
20.  I solve my problems without using
spiritual resources.
7           6   5 4 3 2 1
21. I examine my actions to see if they
reflect my values.
7           6   5 4 3 2 1
22.  How spiritual a person do you consider yourself? (with “7" being the most spiritual)
                                               7                6                 5                 4                 3                2                 1
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APPENDIX C
Revised Moral Authority Scale
________________________________________________________________________
The following list of social issues are often discussed in today's society. 
This questionnaire aims to see ‘who’ and/or 'what' influences your opinion about 
these social issues. 
Instructions
For each issue you need to do four things:
1) Give your opinion on the issue. 
2) Write down why you hold that opinion.
3) Rate the amount of influence of each of the five statements on your opinion.
    Simply write your rating (0, 1, 2, 3,......10) in the space provided for each statement.
    Your rating will be on the following scale:
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
No
Influence
Almost
No
Influence
Little
Influence
Moderate
Influence
Quite a
Strong
Influence
A Very
Strong
Influence
A
Powerful
Influence
4) If there is another factor which is not listed amongst the eight statements, but 
which has influenced your opinion, add it to the list and rate it on the same scale.
Note: There are no right or wrong answers! We are interested in your own opinions, 
and who and/or what has influenced them. So please answer as honestly as possible.
_______________________________________________________________________
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1.  Should people who break the law (such as stealing, speeding etc) be punished? 
Yes / No / Can't decide  (Please circle one )
Why?_____________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
______________
Rate the amount of influence of each statement on your opinion:
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
No
Influence
Almost
No
Influence
Little
Influence
Moderate
Influence
Quite a
Strong
Influence
A Very
Strong
Influence
A
Powerful
Influence
      Rating
a) my family’s beliefs and expectations about certain laws have______  on my opinion
b) my religion/church’s expectations and values have ______ on my opinion  
c) the idea that everyone should try to make society a better place has______  on my opinion
d) my friends’, the media and/or teachers’ beliefs about certain laws have______  on my
opinion  
e) the idea that it satisfies my own interests has ______  my opinion
f) the idea that all people must be treated fairly has______  on my opinion
g) the government, its laws, and its agencies such as the police force and the courts have
________ on my opinion
h)(other)___________________________________________________has ________  on
my opinion
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2.  Should people of different race and color live in harmony with each other? 
     Yes / No / Can't decide  (Please circle one )
Why?_____________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
___________________
Rate the amount of influence of each statement on your opinion:
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
No
Influence
Almost
No
Influence
Little
Influence
Moderate
Influence
Quite a
Strong
Influence
A Very
Strong
Influence
A
Powerful
Influence
            Rating
a) my friends’, the media and/or teachers’ beliefs about racial harmony have______  on my
opinion
b) the idea that society as a whole will benefit from racial harmony has_______  on my
opinion
c) the government, its laws, and its agencies such as the police force and the courts have
________ on my opinion
d) the idea that all people are born equal and should be respected has ______  on my opinion
e) my family’s beliefs on how different races should live has ______  on my opinion
f) my religion/church’s expectations and values have ______ on my opinion  
g) satisfying my own interests about racial harmony has_______  on my opinion
 
h) (other)___________________________________________________has ______  on my
opinion
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3.  Should all people respect the natural environment in which they live? 
     Yes / No / Can't decide  (Please circle one)
Why?_____________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________
Rate the amount of influence of each statement on your opinion:
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
No
Influence
Almost
No
Influence
Little
Influence
Moderate
Influence
Quite a
Strong
Influence
A Very
Strong
Influence
A
Powerful
Influence
                 Rating
a) the idea that respect for the environment benefits society has______  on my opinion
b) the government, its laws, and its agencies such as the police force and the courts have
________ on my opinion 
c) my religion/church’s expectations and values have _____ on my opinion  
d) the belief that all living things should be given some chance for survival has ______ on
my opinion
e) my family’s beliefs and expectations about the environment have______  on my opinion
f) my friends’, the media and/or teachers’ beliefs about environmental issues have______
on my opinion
g) satisfying my own environmental interests has ______  on my opinion
h) (other)___________________________________________________has ______  on my
opinion
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4.  Should 'freedom of speech' (i.e., being able to say publicly what you believe)
     be allowed? 
     Yes / No / Can't decide  (Please circle one )
Why?_____________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________ 
Rate the amount of influence of each statement on your opinion:
       0   1   2   3   4         5   6   7   8   9       10
     No 
Influence
  Almost    
     No
Influence
   Little 
Influence
Moderate
Influence
Quite a 
   Strong 
 Influence
A Very
  Strong
 Influence
    A
 Powerful
 Influence
            Rating
a) my religion/church’s expectations and values have _____ on my opinion  
b) my family’s beliefs and expectations about freedom of speech have______  on my opinion
c) the government, its laws, and its agencies such as the police force and the courts have
________ on my opinion 
d) my friends’, the media and/or teachers’ beliefs about freedom of speech have ______  on
my opinion
e) the idea that every person has an equal right to freedom of speech has______  on my
opinion
f) the idea that freedom of speech makes society a better place to live has______  on my
opinion
g) the belief that freedom of speech may satisfy my own interests has ______  on my opinion
h) (other)___________________________________________________has ______  on my
opinion
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5.  Should equal opportunities be given to people regardless of their race or gender?
     Yes / No / Can't decide  (Please circle one )
Why?_____________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
Rate the amount of influence of each statement on your opinion:
       0   1   2   3   4         5   6   7   8   9       10
     No 
Influence
  Almost    
      No
Influence
   Little 
Influence
Moderate
Influence
 Quite a 
   Strong 
 Influence
  A Very
  Strong
 Influence
       A
 Powerful
 Influence
Rating
a) the government, its laws, and its agencies such as the police force and the courts have
________ on my opinion 
b) the idea that society will benefit from addressing race and gender issues has______  on
my opinion
c) satisfying my own interests on race and gender issues has______  on my opinion
d) my family’s beliefs and expectations on race and gender issues have______  on my
opinion
e) the idea that all people are born equal and should be respected has______  on my opinion
f) my friends’, the media and/or teachers’ ideas on race and gender issues have______  on
my opinion 
g) my religion/church’s expectations and values have _____ on my opinion  
h)(other)___________________________________________________has ______  on my
opinion
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6.  Should scientific research which harms people or the natural environment be       
     allowed?
  Yes / No / Can't decide  (Please circle one )
Why?_____________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________
Rate the amount of influence of each statement on your opinion:
       0   1   2   3   4         5   6   7   8   9       10
     No 
Influence
  Almost    
     No
Influence
   Little 
Influence
Moderate
Influence
 Quite a 
   Strong 
 Influence
  A Very
  Strong
 Influence
       A
 Powerful
 Influence
                                                                                                                         Rating
a) the belief that scientific research may satisfy my own needs has______  on my opinion
b) my family’s beliefs and expectations about scientific research has______  on my opinion
c) the idea that all living things are worthy of respect has______  on my opinion
d) my religion/church’s expectations and values have _____ on my opinion  
e) the idea that scientific research should seek to make society a better place has______  on
my opinion
f) the government, its laws, and its agencies such as the police force and the courts have
________ on my opinion
g) my friends’, the media and/or teachers’ ideas about scientific research have ______  on
my opinion
h) (other)___________________________________________________has ______  on
my opinion
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7.   Should equal opportunities be given to people regardless of their sexual orientation?
     Yes / No / Can't decide  (Please circle one )
Why?_____________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
Rate the amount of influence of each statement on your opinion:
       0   1   2   3   4         5   6   7   8   9       10
     No 
Influence
  Almost    
     No
Influence
   Little 
Influence
Moderate
Influence
 Quite a 
   Strong 
 Influence
  A Very
  Strong
 Influence
       A
 Powerful
 Influence
              Rating
a) the idea that all people are born equal and should be respected has______  on my opinion
 
b) satisfying my own interests on sexual orientation has______  on my opinion
c) my religion/church’s expectations and values have _____ on my opinion  
d) the idea that society will benefit from addressing sexual orientation has______  on my
opinion
e) my family’s beliefs and expectations on sexual orientation have______  on my opinion
f) the government, its laws, and its agencies such as the police force and the courts have
________ on my opinion
g) my friends’, the media and/or teachers’ ideas on sexual orientation have______  on my
opinion 
h) (other)___________________________________________________has ______ on my
opinion
__________________________________________________________________________
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APPENDIX D
Interpersonal Reactivity Index
Please indicate the degree to which the items describe you by choosing the
appropriate point on the five-point scale.  
Does
not                   Describes
describe            me
me            very
well            well
1.  I daydream and fantasize, with some regularity,
     about things that might happen to me.   0  1  2  3  4
2.  I often have tender, concerned feelings for
     people less fortunate than me.   0  1  2  3  4
3.  I sometimes find it difficult to see things from 
     the“other guy’s” point of view.    0  1  2  3  4
4.  Sometimes I don’t feel very sorry for other
      people when they are having problems.   0  1  2  3  4
5.  I really get involved with the feelings of the
     characters in a novel.    0  1  2  3  4
6.  In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive
     and ill-at-ease.    0  1  2  3  4
7.  I am usually objective when I watch a movie
     or play, and I don’t often get completely caught
     up in it.   0  1  2  3  4
8.  I try to look at everybody’s side of a
     disagreement before I make a decision.   0  1  2  3  4
9.  When I see someone being taken advantage
      of, I feel kind of protective towards them.   0  1  2  3  4
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Does
not                   Describes
describe            me
me            very
well            well
10.  I sometimes feel helpless when I am in the
       middle of a very emotional situation.   0  1  2  3  4
11.  I sometimes try to understand my friends better 
       by imagining how things look from their 
 perspective.   0  1  2  3  4
12.  Becoming extremely involved in a good book
        or movie is somewhat rare for me.     0  1  2  3  4
13.  When I see someone get hurt, I tend to remain 
        calm.   0  1  2  3  4
14.  Other people’s misfortunes do not usually
       disturb me a great deal.    0  1  2  3  4
15.  If I’m sure I’m right about something, I don’t
       waste much time listening to other people’s 
       arguments.   0  1  2  3  4
16.  After seeing a play or movie, I have felt as
        though I were one of the characters.   0  1  2  3  4
17.  Being in a tense emotional situation scares me.   0  1  2  3  4
18.  When I see someone being treated unfairly, I
  sometimes don’t feel very much pity for them.    0  1  2  3  4
19.  I am usually pretty effective in dealing with
       emergencies.   0  1  2  3  4
20.  I am often quite touched by things that I see 
       happen.   0  1  2  3  4
21.  I believe that there are two sides to every
       question and try to look at them both.   0  1  2  3  4
22.  I would describe myself as a pretty
       soft-hearted person.  0  1  2  3  4
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Does
not                   Describes
describe            me
me            very
well            well
23.  When I watch a good movie, I can very easily
        put myself in the place of a leading character.  0  1  2  3  4
24.  I tend to lose control during emergencies. 0  1  2  3  4
25.  When I’m upset at someone, I usually try to
        “put myself in his/her shoes” for a while. 0  1  2  3  4
26.  When I am reading an interesting story or
        novel, I imagine how I would feel if the
        events in the story were happening to me. 0  1  2  3  4
27.  When I see someone who badly needs help in 
        an emergency, I go to pieces.  0  1  2  3  4
28.  Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine
       how I would feel if I were in their place. 0  1  2  3  4
________________________________________________________________________
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APPENDIX E
Test of Self-Conscious Affect 3
    Below are situations that people are likely to encounter in day-to-day life, followed by
several common reactions to those situations.
As you read each scenario, try to imagine yourself in that situation.  Then indicate
how likely you would be to react in each of the ways described.  We ask you to rate all
responses because people may feel or react more than one way to the same situation, or
they may react different ways at different times.  
For example:
A.  You wake up early one Saturday morning.  It is cold and rainy outside.
   a) You would telephone a friend to catch up on news.    1---2---3---4---5
                                                       not likely    very likely  
   b) You would take the extra time to read the paper.     1---2---3---4---5
                                                       not likely    very likely  
   c) You would feel disappointed that it’s raining.        1---2---3---4---5
                                                       not likely    very likely  
   d) You would wonder why you woke up so early.           1---2---3---4---5
                                                       not likely    very likely  
In the above example, I've rated ALL of the answers by circling a number.  I
circled a "1" for answer (a) because I wouldn't want to wake up a friend very early on a
Saturday morning -- so it's not at all likely that I would do that.  I circled a "5" for answer
(b) because I almost always read the paper if I have time in the morning (very likely).  I
circled a "3" for answer (c) because for me it's about half and half.  Sometimes I would be
disappointed about the rain and sometimes I wouldn't -- it would depend on what I had
planned.  And I circled a "4" for answer (d) because I would probably wonder why I had
awakened so early. 
    Please do not skip any items -- rate all responses.
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1. You make plans to meet a friend for lunch.  At 5 o'clock, you realize you stood him up.
   a) You would think: "I'm inconsiderate."                1---2---3---4---5
                                                       not likely    very likely  
   b) You would think: "Well, they'll understand."         1---2---3---4---5
                                                       not likely    very likely  
   c) You'd think you should make it up to him as soon     1---2---3---4---5
       as possible.                                    not likely    very likely  
   d) You would think: "My boss distracted me just         1---2---3---4---5
      before lunch."                                   not likely    very likely  
2. You break something at work and then hide it.
   a) You would think: "This is making me anxious.  I      1---2---3---4---5
      need to either fix it or get someone else to."   not likely    very likely  
   b) You would think about quitting.                      1---2---3---4---5
                                                       not likely    very likely  
   c) You would think: "A lot of things aren't made        1---2---3---4---5
      very well these days."                           not likely    very likely  
   d) You would think: "It was only an accident."          1---2---3---4---5
                                                       not likely    very likely  
3. At work, you wait until the last minute to plan a project, and it turns out 
   badly.
  
   a) You would feel incompetent.                          1---2---3---4---5
                                                       not likely    very likely  
   b) You would think: "There are never enough hours       1---2---3---4---5
      in the day."                                     not likely    very likely  
   c) You would feel: "I deserve to be reprimanded for     1---2---3---4---5
      mismanaging the project."                        not likely    very likely  
   d) You would think: "What's done is done."              1---2---3---4---5
                                                       not likely    very likely  
105
4. You make a mistake at work and find out a co-worker is blamed for the error.
   a) You would think the company did not like the         1---2---3---4---5
       co-worker.                                         not likely    very likely  
   b) You would think: "Life is not fair."                 1---2---3---4---5
                                                       not likely    very likely  
   c) You would keep quiet and avoid the co-worker.        1---2---3---4---5
                                                       not likely    very likely  
  
   d) You would feel unhappy and eager to correct the      1---2---3---4---5
      situation.                                       not likely    very likely  
5. While playing around, you throw a ball and it hits your friend in the face.
   a) You would feel inadequate that you can't even        1---2---3---4---5
      throw a ball.                                    not likely    very likely  
   b) You would think maybe your friend needs more         1---2---3---4---5
      practice at catching.                            not likely    very likely  
   c) You would think: "It was just an accident."          1---2---3---4---5
                                                       not likely    very likely  
   d) You would apologize and make sure your friend        1---2---3---4---5
      feels better.                                    not likely    very likely  
6. You are driving down the road, and you hit a small animal.
   a) You would think the animal shouldn't have been       1---2---3---4---5
      on the road.                                     not likely    very likely  
   b) You would think: "I'm terrible."                     1---2---3---4---5
                                                       not likely    very likely  
   c) You would feel: "Well, it was an accident."          1---2---3---4---5
                                                       not likely    very likely  
   d) You'd feel bad you hadn't been more alert            1---2---3---4---5
      driving down the road.                           not likely    very likely  
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7. You walk out of an exam thinking you did extremely well.  Then you find out 
    you did poorly.
   a) You would think: "Well, it's just a test."           1---2---3---4---5
                                                       not likely    very likely  
   b) You would think: "The instructor doesn't like me."   1---2---3---4---5
                                                       not likely    very likely  
   c) You would think: "I should have studied harder."     1---2---3---4---5
                                                       not likely    very likely  
   d) You would feel stupid.                               1---2---3---4---5
                                                       not likely    very likely  
8. While out with a group of friends, you make fun of a friend who's not there.
   a) You would think: "It was all in fun; it's harmless." 1---2---3---4---5
                                                       not likely    very likely  
   b) You would feel small...like a rat.                   1---2---3---4---5
                                                       not likely    very likely  
   c) You would think that perhaps that friend should      1---2---3---4---5
      have been there to defend himself/herself.       not likely    very likely  
   d) You would apologize and talk about that person's     1---2---3---4---5
      good points.                                    not likely    very likely  
9. You make a big mistake on an important project at work.  People were depending on
you, and your boss criticizes you.
   a) You would think your boss should have been more      1---2---3---4---5
      clear about what was expected of you.            not likely    very likely  
   b) You would feel like you wanted to hide.              1---2---3---4---5
                                                       not likely    very likely  
   c) You would think: "I should have recognized the       1---2---3---4---5
      problem and done a better job."                 not likely    very likely  
   d) You would think: "Well, nobody's perfect."           1---2---3---4---5
                                                       not likely    very likely  
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10. You are taking care of your friend's dog while they are on vacation and the 
dog runs away.
   a) You would think, "I am irresponsible and             1---2---3---4---5
      incompetent.”                                    not likely    very likely  
   b) You would think your friend must not take very       1---2---3---4---5
      good care of their dog or it wouldn't have run   not likely    very likely  
away.
   c) You would vow to be more careful next time.          1---2---3---4---5
                                                       not likely    very likely  
 
   d) You would think your friend could just get a         1---2---3---4---5
      new dog.                                         not likely    very likely  
11. You attend your co-worker's housewarming party and you spill red wine on their new
cream-colored carpet, but you think no one notices.
   a) You think your co-worker should have expected        1---2---3---4---5
      some accidents at such a big party.              not likely    very likely  
   b) You would stay late to help clean up the stain       1---2---3---4---5
      after the party.                                 not likely    very likely  
   c) You would wish you were anywhere but at              1---2---3---4---5
      the party.                                       not likely    very likely  
   d) You would wonder why your co-worker chose to         1---2---3---4---5
      serve red wine with the new light carpet.        not likely    very likely 
________________________________________________________________________
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APPENDIX F
The Moral Judgment Test (MJT)
© Copyright for this and all other language versions
by Georg Lind1 1977 - 2002
(Last revision of this text: Jan. 5th, 2004)
The holder of the copyright for all versions of the Moral Judgment Test (MJT) is the
author, Dr. Georg Lind. The authors of translated versions hold a co-copyright. The joint
copyright for translated and certified versions of the MJT is with the author of the translated
version. When used in research and evaluation studies, each copy of the test must bear this
copyright note: “(c) 1977-2002 by Georg Lind, http://www.uni-konstanz.de/agmoral/” plus the
name of the author of the translated version. A list of validated and certified versions of the MJT
is to be found on the web: http://www.uni-konstanz.de/ag-moral/.
The use of the MJT for research and education in public institutions is free. All other
usage (for example, by private institutions and commercial projects for program evaluation and
alike or by privately financed projects) require written permission of the author. The standard
version of the MJT must not be altered without consent by the author. Each copy page of the
MJT must bear the copyright note(c) 1977-2002 Lind. If a non-certified version of the MJT is
used, this must be made recognizable for the reader.
The MJT is designed for research and for the evaluation of programs and policies only. It
is not designed as an instrument for evaluating people, groups of people or individual
institutions, or for the use as a high-stakes test. Such use represents a case of misuse. The MJT
can be applied with participants with average schooling from age of 11 years upward.
Disadvantaged subjects may require some adaption of the administration of the MJT.
The MJT has been constructed on the basis of Lind's Dual Aspect Theory of moral
judgment and development to assess subjects‘ moral judgment competence. Though it uses
Lawrence Kohlberg's (e.g., 1964, p.425) definitions, the MJT employs a different psychological
and psychometric theory. For more details on Lind's theory, the MJT and guidelines to establish
cross-cultural validity of translated versions as well as for the administration of the MJT for non-
standard groups of participants, please visit this web-site: http//www.uni-konstanz.de/ag-moral/.
In pretest-posttest-studies, test weariness may be a problem, resulting in an unusual
lowering of the C-score on the retest. This or a similar instruction helps to avoid this problem:
“Some of the questions will be the same as you have been given the first time. We want to know
whether your thoughts have changed. Please fill them out as sincerely as you did the first time.”
_______________________________________________________________________
1 Author’s address: Prof. Dr. Georg Lind, University of Konstanz, Department of Psychology, D-78457
Konstanz, Germany. Fax: +49-7531 882899, Phone: +49-7531 882895. E-mail: Georg.Lind@uni-konstanz.de. Web site:
http://www.uni-konstanz.de/ag-moral/
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2. Doctor’s Dilemma
A woman had cancer and she had no hope being saved. She was in terrible pain and so weakened
that a large dose of a painkiller such as morphine would have caused her death. During a
temporary period of improvement, she begged the doctor to give her enough morphine to kill her.
She said she could no longer endure the pain and would be dead in a few weeks anyway.
The doctor complied with her wish.
     I strongly              I strongly
               disagree         agree
14. Do you disagree or agree with the doctor's behavior? . . . . . . .  -3   -2   -1   0   +1  +2   +3
______________________________________________________________________________
How acceptable do you find the following arguments in favor of the doctor? Suppose someone
said he acted rightly . . .          I strongly                         I strongly 
reject                                   accept
15. because the doctor had to act according to his conscience.
The woman's condition justified an exception to the moral
obligation to preserve life. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -4   -3   -2   -1   0   +1   +2   +3   +4
16. because the doctor was the only one who could fulfill the
woman's wish; respect for her wish made him act as he did. . . -4   -3   -2   -1   0   +1   +2   +3   +4 
17. because the doctor only did what the woman talked him
into doing. He need not worry about unpleasant
consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . -4   -3   -2   -1   0   +1   +2   +3   +4
______________________________________________________________________________
How acceptable do you find the following arguments against the doctor?  Suppose someone said
that he acted wrongly . . .         I strongly                             I strongly
reject                                   accept
21. because he acted contrary to his colleagues’ convictions.
If they are against mercy-killing the doctor shouldn't do it. .  .  -4   -3   -2   -1   0   +1   +2   +3   +4
22. because one should be able to have complete faith in a
doctor's devotion to preserving life even if someone with
great pain would rather die. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . -4   -3   -2   -1   0   +1   +2   +3   +4
23. because the protection of life is everyone's highest moral 
obligation.  We have no clear moral criteria for 
distinguishing between mercy killing and murder . . . . . . . .  .  -4   -3   -2   -1   0   +1   +2   +3   +4
______________________________________________________________________________
MJT-engl. © 1977-2001 by Georg Lind (rev. 12-2002)
** For the full version of the Moral Judgment Test (both the Worker’s Dilemma and
Doctor’s Dilemma with 12 arguments per dilemma), contact Prof. Dr. Georg Lind at
Georg.Lind@uni-konstanz.de.  
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APPENDIX G
DEMOGRAPHICS FORM
Age:_____
Gender:     
_____Female _____Male
Academic Year in School:
_____Freshman _____Sophomore    _____Junior             _____Senior
Ethnicity:
_____African American _____Asian-Pacific Islander _____Caucasian _____Hispanic
_____Native American _____ Bi- or multi-racial   _____Other
Religious Affiliation:
_____Agnostic      
_____Baptist _____Catholic  _____Jewish _____Methodist _____Mormon
_____Muslim _____Native American _____Non-denominational _____Presbyterian       
  
_____None
_____Other; please specify:_________________________________________________
Participant ID Number :___________________________________________( completed by experimenter)
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